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INTRODUCTION
Tragically, faith communities and their houses of worship are
all too familiar with problems of sexual misconduct by members of
the clergy. For the past several decades, the law courts and the news
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have been thick with stories of sexual abuse of minors by people with
religious authority—stories that involve damaged lives, and tarnished
images of institutions that hold themselves out as existing only for
spiritual and social good.1
In addition to the abuse of minors and its attendant concealment,
however, the experience of religious institutions includes other stories
of sex related misbehavior.2 These involve women and men, serving
or training as clergy in a variety of religious denominations, who have
suffered sexual harassment by their supervisors—usually, though not
always, clergy themselves.3 In this context, perhaps less frequent and
certainly less visible, the law both supports and impedes members of
the clergy seeking to remedy such mistreatment. This Article offers
a normatively compelling and constitutionally appropriate way of
reconciling these competing legal forces.
We start with law’s apparent disregard for claims by clergy who
allege sexual victimization in the workplace, through harassment or
otherwise. The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment bar most
lawsuits, including claims of discrimination, by clergy against their
employers.4 Suits claiming unlawful discrimination in employment,
in particular, are generally precluded by a doctrine known as the “min-
isterial exception.”5 After forty years of recognition of the ministerial
exception in the lower courts, a unanimous Supreme Court in 2012
affirmed the constitutional provenance and the broad reach of that
exception.6 As explicated in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church & School v. EEOC,7 the exception applies to a sweeping range
of anti-discrimination norms, and it extends to a broad category of
employees whose job includes responsibilities to teach the faith.8
A close inspection of the law that has developed under the min-
isterial exception, however, reveals that claims of sexual harassment
based on a pervasive, hostile environment are not subject to that
1. We explore a variety of legal issues raised by suits arising from sexual abuse by
clergy. See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical Immu-
nity, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1789 (2004) [hereinafter Lupu & Tuttle, Ecclesiastical Immunity].
2. See Lupu & Tuttle, Ecclesiastical Immunity, supra note 1, at 1794.
3. See id. at 1795.
4. In earlier work, we analyzed a broad variety of such cases. See Ira C. Lupu & Robert
W. Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and Congregations: Disputes Between Religious Institutions
and Their Leaders, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119, 121 (2009) [hereinafter Lupu & Tuttle,
Courts, Clergy, and Congregations]. We note but do not explore in that article the sexual
harassment issues discussed at length in this Article. Id. at 134 n.84. We also touch on
sexual harassment cases. Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity in
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 1265, 1287, 1303 (2017) [hereinafter Lupu & Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity].
5. Lupu & Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity, supra note 4, at 1278–79.
6. Id. at 1274.
7. 565 U.S. 171, 196 (2012).
8. Id. at 173.
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limitation on suits by clergy.9 The earliest such decision came from
the Minnesota Court of Appeals in 1991,10 and a pair of prominent
and controversial decisions emerged from the Ninth Circuit in 1999
and 2004.11 Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court’s broad decision in
Hosanna-Tabor has not produced any change in the law governing
sexual harassment claims, based on a pervasive hostile environment,
by clergy against their employers.12
Both before and after Hosanna-Tabor, the question presented
by the apparent tension between sexual harassment claims and the
ministerial exception has received little attention from scholars of
employment law13 or the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.14
The employment law concerns are complex, and the constitutional
issues raised by the interaction of sexual harassment law and the
ministerial exception are even more so. Moreover, analyzing this
intersection of employment law and the First Amendment illumi-
nates both. Hosanna-Tabor has thrown Free Exercise law into
considerable doubt,15 and unpacking the harassment question will
9. See, e.g., Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715, 715–16 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
10. Id. at 721.
11. Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 969 (9th Cir. 2004), reh’g
denied, 397 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 2005); Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196
F.3d 940, 948 (9th Cir. 1999). In Elvig, the Ninth Circuit produced a cluster of opinions
related to the denial of en banc review. In Part III, below, we will explore the themes in
these opinions, including one from Judge Kozinski, who recently retired from the bench
in the wake of his own harassment scandal. In accord with Bollard is McKelvey v. Pierce,
800 A.2d 840, 854 (N.J. 2002). The highest level decision rejecting the sexual harassment
exception to the ministerial exception is Skrzypczak v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 611 F.3d
1238, 1246 (10th Cir. 2010), noted in Part IV.
12. Lupu & Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity, supra note 4, at 1287–92.
13. The leading practitioner guide on workplace harassment law, BARBARA T.
LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, WORKPLACE HARASSMENT LAW (2d ed., BNA 2012), does
not even mention the ministerial exception, or the sexual harassment decisions that
either follow or refuse to follow the exception. The only published works we have found
that are primarily devoted to the tension between harassment law and the religion clauses
of the First Amendment are by Rosalie Berger Levinson and Ryan Jaziri. See Rosalie
Berger Levinson, Gender Equality vs. Religious Autonomy: Suing Religious Employers for
Sexual Harassment After Hosanna-Tabor, 11 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 89, 92 (2015); see also
Ryan W. Jaziri, Note, Fixing a Crack in the Wall of Separation: Why the Religion Clauses
Preclude Adjudication of Sexual Harassment Claims Brought by Ministers, 45 NEW ENG.
L. REV. 719, 719 (2011).
14. We are among the very few Religion Clause scholars who have ever focused on
these questions. See Lupu & Tuttle, Ecclesiastical Immunity, supra note 1, at 1794 n.16;
see also Caroline Mala Corbin, Above the Law? The Constitutionality of the Ministerial
Exemption from Antidiscrimination Law, 75 FORD. L. REV. 1965, 2015 n.338 (2007) [here-
inafter Corbin, Above the Law].
15. In recent work, we cited the broad range of scholarly views on the ministerial
exception and discussed each of them at length. See Lupu & Tuttle, The Mystery of
Unanimity, supra note 4, at 1292–1314. Within those pages, see in particular the sources
cited in n.157 (the “institutionalists)”; n.171 (the “implied consent” theorists), n.197 (the
associational freedom theorists); and n.225 (the feminist critics). Professor Nelson Tebbe’s
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help clarify the changes, if any, to free exercise norms worked by
Hosanna-Tabor.
This Article is thus designed to fill a long-standing gap—made
conspicuous by recent developments—in the relevant literature. Part I
describes the contours of the ministerial exception, explains its con-
stitutional provenance, and highlights the issues left open by the
Supreme Court’s sole encounter with the exception in Hosanna-Tabor.
Part II addresses relevant developments in the law of sexual harass-
ment, from the pioneering work of Professor Catharine MacKinnon,16
through and including the Supreme Court’s crucial decisions in
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,17 Harris v. Forklift Systems,
Inc.,18 Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,19 and Faragher v. City
of Boca Raton.20 A central theme—crucial to the intersection between
sexual harassment law and the ministerial exception—in that devel-
opment is the distinction between (1) claims of adverse job actions
(firing, demotion, etc.) resulting from a legally wrongful attention to
sex in the workplace, and (2) claims that involve a severe and perva-
sive hostile environment, independent of any adverse job action.
In Part III, #MeToo meets the ministerial exception. Part III ex-
plores the leading judicial opinions on the relationship between sexual
harassment law and the exception. These include the germinal state
court decisions in Black v. Snyder21 and McKelvey v. Pierce,22 and the
path breaking Ninth Circuit decisions in Bollard v. California Province
of the Society of Jesus,23 and Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church.24
In the law that has emerged, the ministerial exception bars adverse
job action claims but does not bar hostile environment claims.25 That
recent book places the ministerial exception squarely within a generic concept of associa-
tional freedom to choose leaders, available without regard to the association’s religious
character. See generally NELSON TEBBE, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AN EGALITARIAN AGE
80–97 (Harv. Univ. Press 2017). The Court in Hosanna-Tabor explicitly rejected this as
the basis for the ministerial exception. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church
& School v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 189 (2012).
16. See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING
WOMEN (Yale Univ. Press 1979).
17. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
18. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
19. 542 U.S. 742, 763 (1998).
20. 524 U.S. 775, 807–08 (1998).
21. 471 N.W.2d 715, 720–21 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
22. 800 A.2d 840, 858 (N.J. 2002).
23. 196 F.3d 940, 950 (9th Cir. 1999).
24. 375 F.3d 951, 969 (9th Cir. 2004). Elvig offers the added bonus of an opinion by
now retired Judge Kozinski. See id. at 790 (Kozinski, J., concurring in denial of rehearing
en banc). Kozinski, now retired, is no stranger to issues of a sexually hostile environment.
See Niraj Chokshi, Federal Judge Alex Kozinski Retires Abruptly After Sexual Harass-
ment Allegations, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/18/us
/alex-kozinski-retires.html [https://perma.cc/3VQP-S7KQ].
25. See Elvig, 375 F.3d at 953, reh’g denied, Elvig, 397 F.3d at 790.
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brief statement, however, masks the analytical complexities and con-
stitutional concerns arising from the interplay between harassment
law and the ministerial exception. These concerns include matters
of discovery, remedies, and the substance of affirmative defenses to
hostile environment claims.
Part IV applies our theoretical and doctrinal insights to the major
questions raised by this interplay. In our view, the ministerial ex-
ception arises from government’s constitutionally mandated disability
to decide ecclesiastical questions.26 Fitness for ministry—of a class
of persons, or a particular person—is such a question. Accordingly,
we argue that the First Amendment should bar adjudications that
sexual harassment played an unlawful part in adverse job actions
against clergy, and should bar remedial orders of reinstatement and
compensatory front pay awards in all harassment cases. In contrast,
we contend that the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses should not
bar either compensatory or punitive damage claims for pervasive,
hostile environments based on sex. These are claims from which reli-
gious institutions are not immune. We unpack the particular consti-
tutional questions that arise when religious institutions invoke the
affirmative defenses available to employers in hostile environment
cases. In short, we think that courts have made the correct opening
moves in these cases, but that Hosanna-Tabor and the rise of the
#MeToo movement invite new and more theoretically refined consid-
eration of the relevant questions.
We expect that our conclusions will not satisfy ardent proponents
of church autonomy,27 who would like full immunity for houses of
worship in all litigation by clergy. Nor will our approach give much
comfort to those who would eliminate or significantly confine the min-
isterial exception.28 Our analysis represents a challenge, made explicit
in Part IV, to anyone who offers a robust theory, different from our
26. The concepts of Establishment Clause disability, and corresponding immunity of
religious entities, build on a Hohfeldian conception of legal relationships. See Lupu &
Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and Congregations, supra note 4, at 122 n.20; see also Frederick M.
Gedicks, The Religious-Question Doctrine: Free-Exercise Right or Anti-Establishment Im-
munity? 7 (Robert Schuman Ctr. for Advanced Stud. Research Paper No. RSCAS 2016/10),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2746593.
27. See Lupu & Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity, supra note 4, at 1296 n.157.
28. See Joanne C. Brant, “Our Shield Belongs to the Lord”: Religious Employers and a
Constitutional Right to Discriminate, 21 HASTINGS CON. L.Q. 275, 281 (1994); Leslie C.
Griffin, The Sins of Hosanna-Tabor, 88 IND. L.J. 981, 983 (2013); Jane Rutherford, Equality
as the Primary Constitutional Value: The Case for Applying Employment Discrimination
Laws to Religion, 81 CORN. L. REV. 1049, 1059–60 (1996); Robin West, Freedom of the
Church and Our Endangered Civil Rights: Exiting the Social Contract, in MICAH
SCHWARTZMAN, CHAD FLANDERS & ZOË ROBINSON, THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY 399, 399–418 (2016); see also Frederick Mark Gedicks, Narrative Pluralism and
Doctrinal Incoherence in Hosanna-Tabor, 64 MERCER L. REV. 405, 434–35 (2013). See
generally Corbin, Above the Law, supra note 14.
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own, in support of the ministerial exception. Whether the law should
recognize a sexual harassment exception to the ministerial exception
turns entirely on the deeper, often unstated premises underlying each.
I. THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION
In Hosanna-Tabor,29 decided in 2012, a unanimous Supreme
Court held that the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment insu-
late religious institutions from liability for employment discrimina-
tion against members of the clergy. The case involved retaliation
against a religious schoolteacher, Cheryl Perich, who had complained
to the EEOC about alleged discrimination based on disability.30 In
response to that complaint, her employer had fired her.31
As the Court viewed the case, the Establishment Clause and the
Free Exercise Clause operate together to create an affirmative defense
to employment discrimination claims by a ministerial employee in a
case that involved a judgment about her fitness for ministry.32 Ms.
Perich’s pedagogical duties, combined with her status as an ordained
teacher, rendered her a ministerial employee as a matter of law.33 In
the eyes of her employer, her complaint to the EEOC had rendered
her unfit for that position.34
Hosanna-Tabor was unsurprising in some very basic respects.
The proposition that the Religion Clauses immunize religious em-
ployers with respect to adverse employment actions against employ-
ees in clergy roles was hardly new in 2012.35 The Fifth Circuit started
down this path in 1972, and over the next forty years every federal cir-
cuit court of appeals and many state supreme courts followed suit.36
Indeed, no court in the United States ever disputed the basic consti-
tutional idea behind what had come to be known as the “ministerial
exception” to employment laws.37 Courts had applied the exception
to every form of job discrimination forbidden by federal or state law,
including that based on race, sex, national origin, age, disability,
and sexual orientation, along with related employee protections such
as wage and hour laws.38 Moreover, the exception had not been limited
29. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 196
(2012).
30. See id. at 172.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 184.
33. See id. at 191–94.
34. See id.
35. See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 173.
36. See Lupu & Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and Congregations, supra note 4, at 121.
37. Id. at 122.
38. Id. at 127–28.
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to cases of overt exclusion from ministry, for example in the Roman
Catholic Church, Islam, or Orthodox Judaism.39 It extended to all
claims of discrimination, whether overt or covert.40
The issue most likely to be controverted in ministerial exception
cases is whether the complainant’s duties fall under the exception.41
This must be litigated case by case, and actual duties, not job titles
or even ordained status, control the outcome.42 Hosanna-Tabor, in its
close analysis of Cheryl Perich’s job responsibilities, confirmed that
long-standing judicial approach.43
In other ways, however, Hosanna-Tabor was unsettling. The
Court’s unanimity seemed difficult to explain. This was not a lawsuit
by a woman seeking to be ordained as a Catholic priest, Orthodox
Jewish rabbi, or Muslim imam.44 The case thus did not involve a
paradigm situation of formal gender exclusion from the relevant
job.45 Why should the ministerial exception protect houses of wor-
ship, holding themselves out as equal opportunity employers, from
liability for failure to act accordingly? Along these lines, a number
of feminist legal scholars had authored significant critiques of the
ministerial exception,46 and no one expected every Justice to accept
the exception’s full sweep.
Moreover, in addition to allegations of discrimination, Hosanna-
Tabor involved retaliation for a complaint to public authorities.47
The policies behind protecting such complaints extend to protecting
others beyond the complainants themselves.48 And yet these policies
quite literally received no weight in the Court’s analysis.49
39. Id. at 123.
40. The litigated cases all involved claims of covert discrimination. See id. at 128.
41. If the court finds the exception does not apply in the particular case, then other
issues open up. This Article does not explore questions involving whether particular jobs
qualify for the exception. We discuss why such issues must remain open to adjudication.
See Lupu & Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity, supra note 4, at 1278–80.
42. Id. at 1278.
43. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171,
191–94 (2012).
44. See id. at 171.
45. See id. at 179.
46. Caroline Corbin has the most extensive critique. See generally Corbin, Above the
Law, supra note 14. In Hosanna-Tabor, Professor Corbin presented her views to the Court
in an amicus brief, co-authored by Professor Leslie Griffin. See Brief for Prof. Leslie C.
Griffin et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lu-
theran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012) (No. 10-533).
47. See 565 U.S. at 172.
48. See Lupu & Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity, supra note 4, at 1305.
49. The Court refused to balance interests in Hosanna-Tabor. See 565 U.S. at 196
(“When a minister who has been fired sues her church alleging that her termination was
discriminatory, the First Amendment has struck the balance for us.”). We discuss the
constitutional significance of the refusal to balance interests. See Lupu & Tuttle, The
Mystery of Unanimity, supra note 4, at 1275–78.
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The mystery of unanimity was compounded further by the
considerable tension between prevailing doctrines of the Free Exer-
cise Clause, as generated by the decision in Employment Division v.
Smith,50 and the operation of the ministerial exception. Smith held
that the Free Exercise Clause does not support exemptions to religion-
neutral, generally applicable regulation of conduct—in Smith, the
regulation of use and possession of peyote was at issue.51 The minis-
terial exception operates precisely to create a defense to generally
applicable regulations of the employment relationship.52 Chief Jus-
tice Roberts’s effort to distinguish Hosanna-Tabor from Smith on the
ground that the former involved an “internal church decision . . .
affect[ing] the faith and mission of the church itself” while the latter
involved outward “physical acts” is not coherent.53 Using peyote in
sacraments is a decision about faith and mission, and a dismissal of
an employee is an outward act with physical manifestations and
consequences.54
In an article published in early 2017, we set out to solve the
mysteries of Hosanna-Tabor, including its unanimous character.55 We
cannot concisely summarize our complex argument and its supporting
authority, but its essence will be central to understanding our analy-
sis of the sexual harassment questions considered in this Article.
Building on an elaborate body of prior work, we argue that the
ministerial exception is an application of a broader principle that
the state (including its judges) is constitutionally disabled from de-
ciding purely ecclesiastical questions.56 That broader principle has
been applied in numerous decisions involving church property57 or
personnel.58 It rests on both the Establishment Clause, which bars
the state from exercising ecclesiastical functions, and the Free Ex-
ercise Clause, which reserves those functions for private decision
50. 494 U.S. 872, 906–07 (1990).
51. See id. at 904–05.
52. See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190.
53. Id. Although we think the ministerial exception is constitutionally sound, we are
deep skeptics with respect to any general doctrine of Free Exercise exemptions from
general law. See IRA C. LUPU & ROBERT W. TUTTLE, SECULAR GOVERNMENT, RELIGIOUS
PEOPLE 177–210 (2014) [hereinafter LUPU & TUTTLE, SECULAR GOVERNMENT]; Ira C.
Lupu, Hobby Lobby and the Dubious Enterprise of Religious Exemptions, 38 HARV. J.L.
& GENDER 35, 55 (2015).
54. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 173.
55. See generally Lupu & Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity, supra note 4.
56. Id. at 1280–84. See LUPU & TUTTLE, SECULAR GOVERNMENT, supra note 53, at
43–73; see also Lupu & Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity, supra note 4, at 1280–85. See
generally Peter J. Smith & Robert W. Tuttle, Civil Procedure and the Ministerial Ex-
ception, 86 FORD. L. REV. 1847 (2017).
57. See, e.g., Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 441, 451 (1969).
58. See generally Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
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makers.59 The Hosanna-Tabor opinion appropriately cites both
Clauses in support of the ministerial exception,60 though its explicit
avoidance of interest balancing as a methodology demonstrates its
tilt toward the Establishment Clause.61
Hosanna-Tabor emphatically supports our approach in every rele-
vant respect. In the context of claims that an employer has unlawfully
discriminated against a person with ministerial responsibilities—
that is, a person whose duties include teaching and communicating
the faith—the state’s disability to decide ecclesiastical questions trans-
lates into a bar on state evaluation of whether any particular person
is fit for ministry.62 The bar operates both categorically (e.g., are
women or men as a class fit for ministry?) and individually (i.e., is this
particular person fit for ministry?).63 If faith communities are immune
from liability under anti-discrimination laws when these communities
impose a categorical bar, they are equally immune when they impose
a weaker version of it in individual cases (i.e., does this conduct by a
woman pastor render her unfit for ministry, even if it might not render
a man unfit?). The ministerial exception sits comfortably within the
category of ecclesiastical questions, off limits to the state.64 Decisions
in the lower courts before Hosanna-Tabor, and continuing unbroken
after Hosanna-Tabor, are thoroughly consistent with this under-
standing, and frequently confirm in explicit terms that ecclesiastical
questions present a constitutional boundary.65 This proposition, long
settled in First Amendment law, completely explains the unanimity
in Hosanna-Tabor.66
The immunity of religious employers that is triggered by the
ministerial exception does not signify that actions shielded by the
exception operate under a halo of moral right. The exception may
protect decisions about fitness for ministry—for example, on racial
grounds—that most people in our society would find reprehensible.67
The exception is grounded on the constitutionally salutary policy of
removing the state from decision of distinctively religious questions,
and is obviously no guarantee that religious institutions will decide
these questions wisely or virtuously.68
59. See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 184.
60. Id. at 184.
61. See Lupu & Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity, supra note 4, at 1275–78.
62. See id. at 1280.
63. See id. at 1283.
64. See id. at 1280.
65. We cite virtually all the relevant post Hosanna-Tabor decisions (2012–2017). See
Lupu & Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity, supra note 4, at 1287–92.
66. See id. at 1291–92.
67. See id. at 1282.
68. Id.
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In ways that resonate directly with the topic of this Article,
Hosanna-Tabor hints suggestively at the boundaries of the ministe-
rial exception. The EEOC, in opposing recognition of a constitution-
ally based ministerial exception to anti-discrimination norms, had
argued in the Supreme Court that:
[S]uch an exception could protect religious organizations from
liability for retaliating against employees for reporting criminal
misconduct or for testifying before a grand jury or in a criminal
trial. . . . [T]he logic of the exception would confer on religious
employers ‘unfettered discretion’ to violate employment laws by,
for example, hiring children or aliens not authorized to work in
the United States.69
To this quite reasonable set of concerns about the ministerial
exception’s slippery slope, the Court replied:
The case before us is an employment discrimination suit brought
on behalf of a minister, challenging her church’s decision to fire
her. Today we hold only that the ministerial exception bars such
a suit. We express no view on whether the exception bars other
types of suits, including actions by employees alleging breach of
contract or tortious conduct by their religious employers. There
will be time enough to address the applicability of the exception
to other circumstances if and when they arise.70
As we explore in further detail in Part III, sexual harassment claims
present a mixture of concerns sounding in both tort and contract.71
Unlike the typical ministerial exception case, which involves an ad-
verse job action by the employer against a person in ministry, the
questions raised by claims of pervasive and hostile work environment
are not about the complainant’s fitness for the position.72 Hosanna-
Tabor thus leaves wide open the questions we are considering.73
The Hosanna-Tabor opinion emphasized one additional point that
runs through the decisions, canvassed in Part III, in which #MeToo
meets the ministerial exception. To the argument that the church
lacked religious justification for firing Ms. Perich, the Court replied:
That suggestion misses the point of the ministerial exception. The
purpose of the exception is not to safeguard a church’s decision
69. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 195
(2012).
70. Id. at 196.
71. See infra Part III.
72. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993).
73. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 171, 196.
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to fire a minister only when it is made for a religious reason. The
exception instead ensures that the authority to select and con-
trol who will minister to the faithful—a matter ‘strictly ecclesias-
tical,’ . . . is the church’s alone.74
This move is easily misunderstood. It filters the argument about
the quality of a church’s reasons through the prism of “strictly eccle-
siastical” matters, constitutionally off limits from state decision.75 But
it does not suggest that “religious reasons” are always irrelevant to
application of the law to religious organizations.76 As we explain in
Parts III–IV, the relationship between “religious reasons” and claims
of a pervasive, hostile environment based on sex reverberates through
the case law in ways that deserve deeper exploration.
II. THE RELEVANT LAW OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
The law of sexual harassment has developed considerably from
Professor Catharine MacKinnon’s path-breaking work,77 published in
1979, to its more recent refinements in the Supreme Court. The con-
duct that falls under the legal label of sexual harassment involves a
variety of harms to its victims.78 In some of its variations, the harm
is strongly or entirely akin to that of physical sexual assault, prohib-
ited in the criminal law and actionable in the law of torts.79 In other
iterations, the harm is neither criminal nor tortious in the common
law sense, but it nevertheless involves the quite serious upset, de-
moralization, and interference with employment opportunity that
follows from persistent and unwelcome sexual attention.80 Sexual
attention may begin with a veneer of positivity, as in the case of flir-
tation, flattery, and expression of sexual and/or romantic interest.81
Once a person shows unresponsiveness to that interest, the attention
becomes objectively and subjectively unwelcome, and may transform
into ridicule, shaming, and other forms of personal attack.82 When
supervisors—as distinguished from coworkers—harass, the sexual
74. Id. at 194–95 (citing Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 119 (1952)).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 194–96.
77. MACKINNON, supra note 16, at vii.
78. Men as well as women can be harassed, and the harasser may be of the same sex
as the target. See generally Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 76
(1998). Two of the decisions we highlight in Part III involve sexual harassment of males
by other males.
79. MACKINNON, supra note 16, at 158–59.
80. Nicole Spector, The Hidden Health Effects of Sexual Harassment, NBC (Oct. 13,
2017, 11:14 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/better/health/hidden-health-effects-sexual
-harassment-ncna810416 [https://perma.cc/LZS5-X3K2].
81. Marie Jackson, When Does Flirting Become Sexual Harassment?, BBC (Oct. 19,
2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-41665049 [https://perma.cc/8J5J-PSFY].
82. MACKINNON, supra note 16, at 33.
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attention may be associated with threats of job-related punishment
or promises of job-related reward.83
A different kind of harassment involves no sexual attention or
interest at all. Instead, the harassment may involve gender-based
belittling or denigration.84 This form of harassment, analogous to
race-based harassment,85 is also emotionally debilitating and de-
structive of employment opportunity. Whether sexual in content or
not, sex-based harassment operates to reinforce socially defined
gender stereotypes and roles.86
As the narrative below explains, all claims of sexual harass-
ment on the job take one of two legal forms—they either (1) lead to
some kind of adverse job action, such as dismissal, demotion, un-
wanted transfer, denial of promotion, pay cut, etc.,87 or (2) create a
persistent, hostile environment on the basis of sex.88 Some cases
involve both persistent, hostile environment and adverse job action.89
When the law of sexual harassment meets the ministerial exception,
however, the distinction between persistent, hostile environment
and adverse job action takes center stage. As Part III demonstrates,
all adverse job action claims are barred by the ministerial exception,
while at least some persistent, hostile environment claims are not.90
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits sex discrimination in em-
ployment, but sexual harassment was not recognized as a form of
discrimination until several federal court decisions in the District of
Columbia in the mid-1970s.91 Building on those decisions, Professor
83. Id.
84. LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 13, at 16 (“In one common situation . . . women
employees experience . . . scorn, ridicule, and verbal abuse from males who resent their
presence.”).
85. Id. at 3–4 (citing Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 957 (1972)). The Supreme Court approvingly cited Rogers in its germinal decision
on sexual harassment. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson et al., 477 U.S. 57, 65–66
(1986) (“Title VII affords employees the right to work in an environment free from dis-
criminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult.”).
86. For elaboration of these themes, see generally Katherine M. Franke, What’s Wrong
with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691, 696 (1997); Vicki Schultz, Reconceptual-
izing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1687 (1998). This perspective suggests
important questions about theologically grounded conceptions of gender roles. See
discussion infra Part IV.
87. See cases collected in LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 13, at chap. 18.
88. Id. at chap. 19 and cases collected.
89. Eleventh Circuit Recognizes Retaliatory Hostile Work Environment Claim, ABA,
https://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/groups/labor_law/ll_flash/1208_aball_flash/lel
_flash_78-2012hostile.html [https://perma.cc/BH44-YR2N].
90. See infra Part III.
91. Both involved quid pro quo harassment. See generally Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d
983, 985 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that threat of discharge of a woman for refusal to have
sex with supervisor violates Title VII); Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 655–57
(D.D.C. 1976) (holding that refusal of promotion of woman for refusal to have sex with
supervisor violates Title VII), rev’d on other grounds, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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MacKinnon authored her pioneering work on the subject.92 She iden-
tified two primary forms of harassment. These include quid pro quo
harassment, in which a supervisor makes sexual demands on an em-
ployee and conditions continued employment and/or its benefits on
compliance with those demands;93 and hostile environment harass-
ment, in which women are subject to persistent insulting or degrad-
ing treatment that effectively alters their conditions of employment.94
In 1980, the EEOC issued guidelines that built on these early
decisions and scholarship.95 The original guidelines, as summarized
in the leading treatise on the subject, extended the concept of ha-
rassment to include “a sexually hostile environment, involving no
tangible job detriment,”96 as well as quid pro quo harassment. The
guidelines offered the view that unwelcome sexual conduct is action-
able when it “has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering
with an individual’s work performance or creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive working environment.”97
The foundational efforts in support of a theory of sexual harass-
ment, as actionable under Title VII, bore fruit in Meritor Savings
Bank, FSB v. Vinson.98 Mechelle Vinson allegedly had been subjected
by her supervisor to demands for sex, and she testified that she had
acceded to these demands on occasion.99 She also asserted that the
supervisor had harassed her both physically and verbally over a period
of several years.100 The supervisor denied all of these assertions.101
On appeal from a D.C. Circuit ruling in Vinson’s favor on several
points, the Supreme Court affirmed the Circuit in some respects
while reversing and remanding the case on a key question of em-
ployer liability for sexual harassment.102 The Court agreed with the
D.C. Circuit that, (1) a plaintiff can demonstrate a violation of Title
VII by showing a hostile and abusive environment based on sex, even
if the employer has not taken an adverse job action against her;103
(2) that her acceding to sex voluntarily is not a defense if she can
show that the sexual attention from her supervisor was unwelcome,
92. MACKINNON, supra note 16, at vii.
93. Id. at 32–33.
94. Id. at 40.
95. LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 13, at 1-11 to 1-13.
96. Id. at 1–13 (citing various sections of 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11).
97. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3). The sexual harassment guidelines built upon analogous
guidelines and concerns with respect to harassment based on race or national origin. See
LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 13, at 1-11 to 1-13.
98. 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986).
99. Id. at 60.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 61.
102. Id. at 73.
103. Id. at 66.
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and that she acceded for fear of losing her job;104 and (3) that vicarious
employer liability in such a hostile environment case was not auto-
matic, but rather would turn on the relevant “agency principles.”105
The case was remanded for identification and application of those
agency principles.106
Meritor Savings Bank was a breakthrough decision in several
respects. First, it affirmed the EEOC’s articulation of the concept of a
“pervasive, hostile environment” as actionable even in the absence of
economic detriment from an adverse job action.107 In keeping with
the importance of that distinction, the Court emphasized that stan-
dards of employer liability in adverse job action cases would be dif-
ferent from pure hostile environment cases. In the former, the 
employer’s legal responsibility for adverse job actions taken by its
agents is vicarious and automatic.108 In contrast, hostile environ-
ment cases present a different set of questions of employer responsi-
bility.109 As we will explain below, this distinction and the law that
has emerged from it are of crucial importance in the cases that are
the primary concern of this Article.
Seven years later, the Supreme Court offered further definition
of the elements of a sexual harassment claim in Harris v. Forklift
Systems, Inc.110 Teresa Harris was a manager at Forklift Systems,
an equipment rental company.111 The record included findings that
her supervisor, the company President, “often insulted her because
of her gender and often made her the target of unwanted sexual
innuendos.”112 The Court of Appeals had ruled against her sexual
harassment claim on the ground that she had not demonstrated psy-
chological injury from the mistreatment.113 In an opinion by Justice
O’Connor, a unanimous Supreme Court rejected the requirement of
psychological injury.114 Instead, the Court emphasized that a hostile
environment is actionable if a reasonable person would find the
environment hostile and the plaintiff herself experienced it that
way.115 The opinion further explained that:
104. Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 68.
105. Id. at 72.
106. Id. at 73.
107. Id. at 64.
108. Id. at 70–71.
109. Id. at 71–72.
110. 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
111. Id. at 19.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 20.
114. Id. at 23.
115. Id. at 21–22.
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whether an environment is “hostile” or “abusive” can be deter-
mined only by looking at all the circumstances. These may include
the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether
it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive
utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an em-
ployee’s work performance. The effect on the employee’s psycho-
logical well-being is, of course, relevant to determining whether
the plaintiff actually found the environment abusive. But while
psychological harm, like any other relevant factor, may be taken
into account, no single factor is required.116
The Harris opinion thus reaffirmed the holding of Meritor Savings
Bank that pervasive hostile environments are actionable as sex dis-
crimination under Title VII, even in the absence of an adverse job
action. Moreover, it specified the considerations that lawyers, the
EEOC, and lower courts should apply in appraising such claims—
the frequency and severity of the discriminatory conduct, under-
stood both objectively (to a reasonable person) and subjectively by
the complainant.117
After Meritor Savings Bank and Harris, there remained crucial
questions of employer liability for the pervasive, hostile environment
form of sexual harassment.118 As the Court explained in Meritor
Savings Bank, employers face vicarious liability whenever harass-
ment produces an adverse job action—the harasser and/or his allies
within the firm without question act with the company’s authority
in taking actions that produce material detriment to the target.119
But Meritor Savings Bank had left open the question of employer
liability for a pervasive, hostile environment.120 The Court had of-
fered only the limited guidance that such liability should depend on
“agency principles,”121 and Harris did not put such principles to any
test, because the decision involved the company President, who
clearly spoke for the firm.122
That guidance expanded dramatically in Burlington Industries,
Inc. v. Ellerth123 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,124 decided on the
same day in 1998. In these companion decisions, the Court explained
116. Harris, 510 U.S. at 23.
117. Id. at 21–22.
118. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986).
119. Id. at 70–71.
120. See id. at 73.
121. Id. at 72.
122. Because Harris involved the company President, the case presented no issues of
vicarious liability. The President clearly spoke for the company. See Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 789 (1998) (“[Harris] was indisputably within that class of an
employer organization’s officials who may be treated as the organization’s proxy.”).
123. 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
124. 524 U.S. at 780.
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the content and operation of the relevant agency principles in the con-
text of claims of a pervasive hostile environment based on sex.125
Kimberly Ellerth had been employed by Burlington Industries as a
salesperson and had quit her job in the wake of unwelcome sexual
attention from her supervisor.126 Ellerth brought her claim under
the rubric of hostile environment, but the lower courts had identified
a strain of quid pro quo harassment in the facts, and the Seventh
Circuit (sitting en banc) had split widely on the relevant principles
of employer liability.127
In an opinion for seven Justices in Ellerth,128 Justice Kennedy
clarified that the concept of quid pro quo harassment was useful as a
way of characterizing certain sex discrimination claims, but was not
dispositive on the relevant standard of employer liability. When a
supervisor carries out a threat to dismiss or punish an employee who
refuses sexual demands, the case involves an adverse job action for
which the employer has vicarious liability.129 When such a threat is not
carried out, however, the case involves a hostile environment, of which
the quid pro quo threat is perhaps only a part.130 In such cases, the
question of employer liability is more complex.
The Court thus treated Ellerth as a hostile environment case,
which assimilated it completely with Faragher, a straightforward
125. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 758–59; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 801–02.
126. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 748.
127. Id. at 750–51.
128. Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, filed a dissenting opinion, asserting that
employer liability for hostile environment harassment should depend on proof of employer
negligence. Id. at 766–67 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 760–61 (citing Meritor Savings Bank and “[e]very Federal Court of Appeals
to have considered the question . . . .”). The Court in Ellerth explained further:
When a supervisor makes a tangible employment decision, there is assurance
the injury could not have been inflicted absent the agency relation. A tangible
employment action in most cases inflicts direct economic harm. As a general
proposition, only a supervisor, or other person acting with the authority of
the company, can cause this sort of injury.
Id. at 761–62.
130. Id. at 753–54.
To the extent they illustrate the distinction between cases involving a threat
which is carried out and offensive conduct in general, the terms [quid pro
quo and hostile environment] are relevant when there is a threshold question
whether a plaintiff can prove discrimination in violation of Title VII. When
a plaintiff proves that a tangible employment action resulted from a refusal
to submit to a supervisor’s sexual demands, he or she establishes that the
employment decision itself constitutes a change in the terms and conditions
of employment that is actionable under Title VII. For any sexual harassment
preceding the employment decision to be actionable, however, the conduct
must be severe or pervasive. Because Ellerth’s claim involves only unfulfilled
threats, it should be categorized as a hostile work environment claim which
requires a showing of severe or pervasive conduct.
Id.
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hostile environment case involving a female lifeguard employed by
the City.131 Beth Ann Faragher had worked part-time over five years
as an ocean lifeguard.132 She and other female lifeguards had been
subjected to repeated unwanted touching and persistent lewd com-
ments by several of their on-site supervisors.133 Their complaints to
the senior on-site supervisor had not been passed on to higher-up
city officials or discussed with the offenders.134
Justice Souter wrote for the same seven-Justice majority in
Faragher.135 Unsurprisingly, on the question of employer liability for
a pervasive, hostile environment based on sex, the opinions in
Faragher and Ellerth presented a unified viewpoint on the relevant
principles of agency.136 The Court began with the principle of agency
law that a “master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants
committed while acting in the scope of their employment.”137 Because
most sexual harassment of employees is not in the service of the em-
ployer’s business,138 that principle does not support employer liability.
In hostile environment cases, liability may rest on employer negli-
gence (as in the obvious case where an employer hires a known serial
harasser and gives him supervisory authority over female employ-
ees).139 More typically, however, as explained in both Faragher and
Ellerth, the relevant agency principle imposes liability when the
harasser is “aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the
agency relation.”140
As Justice Souter notes in Faragher and Justice Kennedy like-
wise in Ellerth, every act of supervisor harassment is aided by the
agency relationship.141 The relationship provides the harasser with
a pool of supervisees, and a mantle of authority under which he can
threaten, belittle, humiliate, and proposition for sex any of the em-
ployees under his watch.142 Both opinions thus recognize, and dis-
cuss at considerable length, the tension between (1) the principle of
no vicarious liability for torts outside the scope of employment, and
131. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 780 (1998).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 782–83.
135. Justices Thomas and Scalia again dissented. Id. at 810–11 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
136. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998); Faragher, 524 U.S.
at 802.
137. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 793 (quoting Restatement of Agency, § 219(1)).
138. Id. at 793–94.
139. See id. at 789.
140. Id. at 801 (citing Restatement of Agency, § 219(2)(d)); Burlington Indus., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 758 (1998) (same).
141. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 802.
142. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760.
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(2) a competing principle of employer liability for all torts committed
by supervisors against supervisees.143
Both opinions resolve this tension with the creation of an affir-
mative defense, designed to facilitate the policies of Title VII as well
as to reflect the relevant agency principles.144 Because this move in the
law of sexual harassment is central to our analysis in Parts III–IV, it
is worth quoting the entirety of the relevant passage from Faragher:
In order to accommodate the principle of vicarious liability for
harm caused by misuse of supervisory authority, as well as Title
VII’s equally basic policies of encouraging forethought by em-
ployers and saving action by objecting employees, we adopt the
following holding in this case and in Burlington Industries, Inc.
v. Ellerth, . . . also decided today. An employer is subject to
vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an actionable hostile
environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or succes-
sively higher) authority over the employee. When no tangible
employment action is taken, a defending employer may raise an
affirmative defense to liability or damages, subject to proof by a
preponderance of the evidence . . . . The defense comprises two
necessary elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care
to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior,
and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take
advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided
by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.145
The affirmative defense reflects foundational tort law principles
as well as the anti-discrimination concerns of Title VII.146 Through
the first portion of the defense—that the employer exercise reason-
able care both to prevent, and to correct promptly, any sexually
143. See generally Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 748–55; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 793–805.
144. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
145. 524 U.S. at 807–08 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Justice Souter added:
While proof that an employer had promulgated an antiharassment policy
with complaint procedure is not necessary in every instance as a matter of
law, the need for a stated policy suitable to the employment circumstances
may appropriately be addressed in any case when litigating the first ele-
ment of the defense. And while proof that an employee failed to fulfill the
corresponding obligation of reasonable care to avoid harm is not limited to
showing an unreasonable failure to use any complaint procedure provided
by the employer, a demonstration of such failure will normally suffice to
satisfy the employer’s burden under the second element of the defense. No
affirmative defense is available, however, when the supervisor’s harassment
culminates in a tangible employment action, such as discharge, demotion,
or undesirable reassignment.
Id. at 807–08. For a comparable excerpt from Ellerth, see 524 U.S. at 758–60.
146. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806.
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harassing behavior, the defense emphasizes the reduction of harm
through precautions and amelioration.147 The availability of this de-
fense creates strong incentives for employers to announce specific pol-
icies against sexual harassment by coworkers or supervisors; to train
employees in the meaning and significance of sexual harassment; to
have in place mechanisms of quick response to complaints; and to take
swift action to discipline or dismiss perpetrators of harassment.148
The requirement of reasonable care does not, of course, mean
perfectly adequate steps to prevent and correct sexual harassment.
As one commentator has noted, in the wake of Ellerth and Faragher
the lower courts have been strongly inclined to find that employers
have satisfied the defense when their policies on paper measure up,
even though the operation of the policies leave room for real doubt
about their efficacy.149 One key concern about these complaint and
correction policies is whether they permit harassment victims to
safely report the offense through channels that do not involve the
perpetrator.150 Fear of reprisals will discourage the reporting neces-
sary to make a corrective policy effective.151
The second step in the Ellerth-Faragher defense—that the
plaintiff-employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any pre-
ventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to
avoid harm otherwise—is an application of the basic tort law principle
that potential victims should take reasonable steps to avoid or mini-
mize harm.152 As with step one, however, the notion of reasonableness
is doing substantial work.153 As noted above, fear of reprisal may be a
significant impediment to reporting harassment.154 Although step two,
as part of an affirmative defense, appears to place the burden of proof
on an employer on the question of “unreasonab[e] fail[ure] to take
advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by
147. Id. at 807–08.
148. For a detailed development of the connection between the affirmative defense and
measures in the workplace that spur constructive engagement with role of women and
minorities in the work force, see Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimi-
nation: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 482, 489–90 (2001).
149. See Anne Lawton, Operating in an Empirical Vacuum: The Ellerth & Faragher
Affirmative Defense, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197, 198 (2004); see also Lauren B.
Edelman et al., When Organizations Rule: Judicial Deference to Institutionalized Em-
ployment Structures, 117 AMER. J. SOC. 888, 903 (2011).
150. Lisa Krupicka, 5 Mistakes to Avoid in Implementing a Harassment Policy, HR
PROF. MAG., http://hrprofessionalsmagazine.com/5-mistakes-to-avoid-in-implementing
-a-harassment-policy [https://perma.cc/CQ3E-JSW5].
151. Lawton, supra note 149, at 257.
152. Id. at 261.
153. Id. at 257.
154. Id.
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the employer,” in operation this step is likely to put the burden on an
employee to explain exactly why she did not pursue those opportu-
nities—that is, if the employer’s response mechanisms are found to
be reasonable, failure to pursue them will appear presumptively un-
reasonable.155 In particular, courts will sometimes find a delay in
reporting harassment, however understandable from the victim’s
perspective in light of discomfort and fear of reprisal, to constitute
unreasonable failure to take advantage of corrective mechanisms.156
Judicial evaluation of the reasonableness of employer processes
raises significant constitutional questions in the analysis of poten-
tial liability of religious organizations in Parts III–IV. The law of
remedies for sexual harassment also plays an important part in the
issues we analyze in the remainder of the Article. The remedial law
under Title VII includes compensatory damages, punitive damages
in appropriate cases, and the equitable remedy of reinstatement in
some cases of wrongful dismissal.157 When #MeToo meets the minis-
terial exception, reinstatement is constitutionally barred, as is front
pay as a remedy in lieu of reinstatement.158 As we will explain,
compensatory damages may be available in cases of a pervasive hos-
tile environment, as are punitive damages in appropriate cases.159
Because claims for punitive damages are subject to a defense that
the employer has made “good faith efforts to enforce an antidiscrimi-
nation policy,”160 the constitutional questions raised by judicial evalu-
ation of the personnel policies and practices of religious entities may
at this stage, too, be put into play.
III. #METOO MEETS THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION
The collision between harassment claims and the ministerial
exception took some time to develop. Courts first applied the minis-
terial exception to anti-discrimination law in McClure v. Salvation
Army161 (1972), a ruling based on statutory grounds. At that time, the
theory of sexual harassment as discrimination had not yet appeared
155. Id. at 242–57.
156. Id. at 253–54 (citing cases).
157. The statutory provisions and case law that undergird the remedial regime in
harassment cases are succinctly summarized in LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 13, at
33-1 to 33-37.
158. Id. at 33-17.
159. See infra Part IV.
160. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 546 (1999). Kolstad appeared just one
year after the decisions in Ellerth and Faragher.
161. See generally 460 F.2d 553, 560 (5th Cir. 1972) (construing Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act to exclude religious bodies, hiring for positions of religious significance,
from the statutory prohibition on gender discrimination).
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in the law or commentary respecting Title VII.162 Rayburn v. General
Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists163 (1985) represents the first
square holding that the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment
require a ministerial exception from non-discrimination law.
Over the next twenty years, state and federal courts decided a
quartet of cases in which sexual harassment law collided with asser-
tions of the ministerial exception.164 As the analysis below reveals,
the first and fourth in the quartet both involve female assistant
pastors who complained about sexual harassment by their immedi-
ate supervisor, a male pastor.165 The second and third were decided
close in time to one another, and both involved claims by a male
student for the priesthood that he was sexually harassed by male
supervisors in a Catholic seminary.166 The last three in this quartet
were decided soon after the Supreme Court’s creation of an affirma-
tive defense to hostile environment claims in Ellerth-Faragher.167
A. The Opening Round: Black v. Snyder
Black v. Snyder168 was the first appellate decision to find that the
ministerial exception does not bar a sexual harassment claim by a
member of the clergy.169 In 1989, Susan Black was hired as Associate
Pastor at St. John’s Lutheran Church170 in a suburb of Minneapolis.
While still working at St. John’s in April 1990, Black filed a discrim-
ination charge with the state Department of Human Rights against
her supervisor, Pastor William Snyder.171 Black alleged that Snyder
had made unwelcome sexual advances, including (1) unwanted
physical and sexual contact; (2) remarks by Snyder to third parties
that he and Black were “lovers”; and (3) demands from Snyder that
Black engage in companionship with him outside the workplace.172
162. See The History of Sexual Harassment Law, NOLO, https://www.employmentlaw
firms.com/resources/employment/workplace-safety-and-health/sexual-harassment-law
.htm [https://perma.cc/E4MG-JTLT] (explaining that sexual harassment was not recognized
by the Supreme Court as a form of sex discrimination until the 1980s).
163. See 772 F.2d 1164, 1165, 1168–69 (4th Cir. 1985).
164. See discussion infra Part III.
165. See Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 953–54 (9th Cir. 2004);
Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715, 717–18 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
166. See McKelvey v. Pierce, 800 A.2d 840, 842, 853–54 (N.J. 2002).
167. See Ellerth v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 524 U.S. 742, 745 (1998). Ellerth was de-
cided in 1998, Bollard was decided in 1999, McKelvey was decided in 2002, and Elvig was
decided in 2003.
168. See generally 471 N.W.2d at 715.
169. Id. at 717.
170. St. John’s Lutheran Church is a congregation of the Evangelical Lutheran
Church in America. Id. at 717.
171. Id. at 717–18.
172. Id.
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Before complaining to the state agency, Black told members of the
St. John’s Church council, the relevant church personnel commit-
tees, and representatives of the regional Lutheran Synod of her
complaints against Snyder.173 The congregation and synod investi-
gated but took no action.174
In the summer of 1990, the St. John’s congregation voted to dis-
miss Black.175 She then sued the congregation, synod, and Snyder on
a variety of state law claims, including breach of contract, retaliation,
wrongful termination, and sexual harassment in employment.176 The
lower court dismissed all the claims against the institutional defen-
dants on First Amendment grounds.177
On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed with respect
to the sexual harassment claim alone.178 Noting the U.S. Supreme
Court’s then-recent decision in Employment Division v. Smith,179 the
Minnesota court rejected the church’s free exercise argument, because
the state laws on which Black’s claims rested were generally appli-
cable to employers, without regard to their religious character.180
The court took far more seriously the church’s Establishment
Clause–based argument that adjudicating Black’s claims would lead
to excessive entanglement between the church and the state.181 As
the court summarized the relevant principle, “[w]hen claims involve
‘core’ questions of church discipline and internal governance, . . . the
inevitable danger of governmental entanglement precludes judicial
review.”182 Applying this principle, the Court concluded that most of
Black’s claims against the Church, including defamation, wrongful
discharge, and retaliation for filing a complaint with a government
agency, would “require a . . . review of the church’s reasons for
discharging Black, an essentially ecclesiastical concern.”183 Accord-
ingly, the Establishment Clause barred those claims.184
In sharp contrast, however, the Minnesota appellate court
noted that Black’s claim of sex discrimination based on persistent,
173. See id. at 718.
174. The report of the allegations, church response, and procedural posture can be
found in Black, 471 N.W.2d at 718.
175. Id. at 717–18.
176. Id. at 718.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 721.
179. Id. at 719 (citing Emp’t Div. Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990)).
180. Black, 471 N.W.2d at 719.
181. See id. at 718–20.
182. Id. at 720 (citing Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 717,
721 (1976)).
183. Id. at 720.
184. See id.
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unwelcome sexual attention was based on predischarge conduct and
was “unrelated to pastoral qualifications or issues of church doc-
trine.”185 Moreover, Black sought money damages only, and was not
asking for an order of reinstatement to her position.186 Accordingly,
the court remanded the case to allow Ms. Black to proceed against
the church with her hostile environment claim.187
In his dissent, Judge Randall highlighted an issue that would
later become central to the tension in sexual harassment cases against
religious organizations.188 In this dispute, he wrote, both the congre-
gation and the synod had investigated Black’s harassment claim
and had decided not to exercise their powers of supervision and
discipline.189 Letting the case proceed would thus interfere with the
church’s freedom to decide whether to continue Snyder’s service at
St. John’s, and if so, whether to transfer or dismiss Black.190 “[W]e
are restrained,” he concluded, “by the establishment clause from in-
terjecting government oversight into the ecclesiastical decision
process on whether to discipline or remove a pastoral member.”191
Black v. Snyder foreshadows perfectly the key issues in later
cases involving sexual harassment claims by clergy.192 The opinion
addresses the distinction between free exercise approaches (barely
relevant) and Establishment clause–based entanglement concerns
(central); the distinction between adjudicating the wrongfulness of
the discharge (forbidden) versus adjudicating the wrongfulness of
the hostile environment (allowed); the distinction between equitable
remedies like reinstatement or substitutes for it (forbidden) and
damage remedies for the past harms imposed by the hostile environ-
ment (allowed); and the permissibility of judging the legal adequacy
of corrective mechanisms within the religious organization.193 The
rest of the decisions in this quartet play out those themes.194
185. Id. at 721.
186. Black, 421 N.W.2d at 721.
187. Id. (citing cases allowing enforcement against religious entities of laws concerning
the abuse of children and the regulation of buildings). The court also rejected the Church’s
state constitutional claim. Minnesota has a proexemption regime of religious liberty, but
the Church’s own antiharassment policy undermined any claim that the harassment
lawsuit burdened the Church’s exercise of religion. Id.
188. Id. at 721–23 (Randall, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 722.
190. Id. at 723.
191. Black, 421 N.W.2d at 723. The majority in Black did not directly answer this
assertion.
192. See discussion infra Section III.B.
193. See Black, 471 N.W.2d at 718–21.
194. See discussion supra Part III; infra Section III.B.
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B. The Seminary Cases: Bollard v. California Province of the
Society of Jesus and McKelvey v. Pierce
Bollard v. California Province of the Society of Jesus195 and
McKelvey v. Pierce196 involved former seminarians (in both cases
male) who had prepared for the Catholic priesthood over eight years
and had abandoned their efforts shortly before the time of ordina-
tion. Decided just two years apart, the decisions present what
McKelvey described as “striking[ ] similar[ities]” in both the facts
and the constitutional defenses offered by the defendant religious
institutions.197 Both followed the trail blazed by Black v. Snyder,
and recognized that compensatory damage claims for a sexually
hostile environment are not barred by the First Amendment.198
John Bollard became a Jesuit novice in 1988.199 He spent four
years at a Jesuit high school,200 and the next four years at the Jesuit
School of Theology in Berkeley, California. His complaint alleged
that beginning in 1990, and continuing through 1996,
various [Jesuit] superiors at these two institutions sent him porno-
graphic material, made unwelcome sexual advances, and engaged
him in inappropriate and unwelcome sexual discussions. Between
mid-1995 and 1996, Bollard reported the harassment to superiors
within the Jesuit order, but, so far as he knows, his reports
prompted no corrective action. He alleges that the harassing
conduct was so severe that he was forced to leave the Jesuit
order in December 1996 before taking vows to become a priest.201
Bollard filed federal and state administrative complaints, and
eventually filed suit in federal court, where he brought claims against
the California Province of the Society of Jesus (“the Jesuit Order”)
under Title VII as well as various state law theories.202 The district
195. See 196 F.3d 940, 944 (9th Cir. 1999).
196. See 800 A.2d 840, 844–45 (N.J. 2002).
197. See id. at 853–54. For a set of thoughtful suggestions concerning the reform of
Catholic seminaries, see The Rev. Thomas V. Berg, Want to Address Priest Sexual Abuse?
The Catholic Church Needs to Overhaul its Seminaries., WASH. POST (Oct. 18, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/religion/2018/10/18/want-address-priest-sex-abuse
-catholic-church-needs-overhaul-its-seminaries/?utm_term=.ba51fe708c4f [https://perma
.cc/2NW5-XEYJ].
198. See Bollard, 196 F.3d at 944; McKelvey, 800 A.2d at 842, 858.
199. Bollard, 196 F.3d at 944.
200. St. Ignatius College Preparatory School, see id. at 944. Governor Jerry Brown is an
alumnus. See also Keeping in Touch, ST. IGNATIUS COLL. PREPARATORY (Apr. 17, 2015),
https://www.siprep.org/alumni/genesis-magazine/genesis/keeping-in-touch/~board/keeping
-in-touch/post/keeping-in-touch-spring-2015 [https://perma.cc/WA9R-GJXZ].
201. Bollard, 196 F.3d at 944.
202. Id.
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court dismissed the suit on the ground that it was barred by the
ministerial exception.203 On appeal, Judge Fletcher’s opinion for the
panel reversed in part, and remanded in light of its conclusion that
the First Amendment does not bar claims for damages based on a
hostile environment.204
The opinion analyzed what it perceived as the Free Exercise
and Establishment Clause components of the ministerial excep-
tion.205 Unlike the Minnesota Court of Appeals in Black v. Snyder,
the Ninth Circuit panel did not treat Employment Division v. Smith
as having erased the doctrine of free exercise exemptions in this
context.206 Judge Fletcher, invoking the balancing test of Sherbert
v. Verner, treated the Supreme Court’s line of cases on church author-
ity over personnel as consistent with a doctrine of free exercise bal-
ancing.207 For several reasons, however, he found the Jesuit Order’s
arguments wanting. First, the suit did not interfere with the Order’s
choice of priests.208 The Order wanted Bollard to remain, and he left
of his own volition because of the harassment.209 Second, the Order
did not embrace sexual harassment of seminarians as a method of
training, nor did they justify on religious grounds their disciplinary
inaction in response to Bollard’s complaints.210 Accordingly, the
Jesuit Order’s exercise of religion was not burdened by allowing civil
actions in response to hostile environment harassment and the Free
Exercise Clause, thus, did not bar the lawsuit.211
Judge Fletcher then turned to the Establishment Clause justifi-
cations for the ministerial exception.212 His opinion focused on the
question of excessive entanglement between the state and a reli-
gious institution, and he divided that question into substantive and
procedural components.213 Judge Fletcher rejected the argument
that this case presented issues of substantive entanglement for
precisely the same reason that he rejected the Jesuit Order’s free
203. Id.
204. Id. at 950–51.
205. Id. at 945–47.
206. Compare Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715, 719 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (citing
Emp’t Div. Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 872 (1990)), with Bollard,
196 F.3d at 947.
207. Bollard, 196 F.3d at 946, 948 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 403–07
(1963)). Hosanna-Tabor later clarified that the interest balancing mode of analysis under
the free exercise clause is inapposite in ministerial exception cases. See Lupu & Tuttle,
The Mystery of Unanimity, supra note 4, at 1278.
208. Bollard, 196 F.3d at 947.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 948.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 948–49.
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exercise claim—that is, because the litigation did not implicate the
Order’s freedom to choose its priests.214
In its turn to procedural entanglement, the opinion focused on the
central problems presented by the case. As the panel noted, without
a substantive conflict about Bollard’s fitness for the priesthood, the
remaining statutory questions were: whether Bollard had been ex-
posed to a severe and pervasive hostile environment, and whether
the Order could satisfy the elements of the Ellerth-Faragher affir-
mative defense.215 Both inquiries, the panel concluded, involved
secular judgments about the content of the harassment and whether
the Order had taken reasonable steps to prevent and correct it.216
Moreover, Bollard was not seeking equitable Title VII remedies,
including reinstatement or any form of judicial monitoring of future
employer conduct.217 Those remedies would unconstitutionally en-
tangle the courts with a religious institution.218 Instead, he sought
only the remedy of money damages for prior wrongdoing.219 If he
prevailed on the merits, courts could provide that remedy without
constitutional problems.220
Bollard very precisely extended the Black v. Snyder template—
on substance, defenses, remedies, and the overarching constitutional
questions—into the context of harassment of seminarians in train-
ing for the clergy.221 Two years later, in McKelvey v. Pierce,222 the
New Jersey Supreme Court confronted a similar dispute, and pro-
ceeded in quite the same way.
After being accepted in 1985 as a candidate for the priesthood by
the Diocese of Camden (N.J.), Christopher McKelvey began an eight-
year journey through St. Pius X Seminary (1985–89) and St. Charles
Borromeo Seminary (1989–93) near Philadelphia.223 McKelvey in-
terned at various New Jersey parishes during his years at St. Charles,
214. Bollard, 196 F.3d at 948–49. That the Order’s free exercise and establishment
clause arguments coincided in this way foreshadowed Hosanna-Tabor’s analysis of the
ministerial exception, which involves both clauses operating together. See Hosanna-
Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 184 (2012).
215. Bollard, 196 F.3d at 949.
216. Id. at 950. In addition, the district court could control discovery to avoid constitu-
tionally sensitive questions. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Bollard, 196 F.3d at 950. The panel thus remanded the case, including Bollard’s
state law claims, for resolution in the district court. Id. at 950–51. To the best of our
knowledge, the case then settled, as did all the cases in the quartet we are discussing in
this Part. Religious institutions, like most others, do not want to have public trials focused
on the hostile sexual environment in their workplace.
221. See id. at 947–48.
222. See 800 A.2d 840, 853–54 (N.J. 2002).
223. Id. at 845.
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but he dropped out of the program in 1993, before being ordained.224
Based on theories of contract and tort, McKelvey sued the Diocese
of Camden and various individual defendants.225 He alleged that the
defendants and their employees “fostered, tolerated, permitted and
encouraged inappropriate sexual conduct which included, but was
not limited to, persistent and frequent demands whereby plaintiff was
subjected and exposed to unreasonable, unlawful, immoral homosex-
ual and other deviant discussions and/or contact.”226 The lower
courts in New Jersey dismissed McKelvey’s claims on the ground
that they required a constitutionally impermissible inquiry into the
existence and content of an implied contract between McKelvey and
the Diocese.227
A unanimous New Jersey Supreme Court reversed.228 The Court
noted that “[t]he First Amendment clearly ‘bars government from
involving itself in purely ecclesiastic[al] matters, including . . . re-
tention of . . . ministers.’ ”229 After a lengthy and careful review of
the leading decisions, including Bollard, under both the Free Exer-
cise Clause and the Establishment Clause,230 the Court synthesized
the relevant legal principles.231 “Before barring a specific cause of
action,” the court wrote:
a court first must analyze each element of every claim and deter-
mine whether adjudication would require the court to choose
224. Id. at 846.
225. Id. at 842.
226. Id. at 845. The opinion includes more detail about the persistent and hostile
environment, which McKelvey alleged was inconsistent with various representations
made by the Diocese about the atmosphere in an educational program aimed at training
priests who would take a vow of celibacy. Id. at 845–46. McKelvey might never have
brought this lawsuit but for a rather misguided letter from the Diocese, alerting him that
his withdrawal from the training program rendered McKelvey indebted to the Diocese
for over $69,000. See McKelvey, 800 A.2d at 846. At that point, he filed his suit, asserting
that the Diocese was in breach of an implied contract with him and that he therefore
owed nothing. Id.
227. Id. at 846–47.
228. Id. at 842.
229. Id. at 847 (quoting Weaver v. African Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., 54
S.W.3d 575, 580 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001)).
230. McKelvey, 800 A.2d at 847–56. The Diocese relied only on the Establishment
Clause, perhaps because church lawyers had learned from Bollard that Free Exercise
defenses were likely to be met with an inquiry into whether sexual harassment was an
intended part of the training of priests. The New Jersey Supreme Court also examined
what it referred to as the “church autonomy” doctrine and concluded that there is no such
doctrine independent of the more particular dictates of the Free Exercise and Estab-
lishment Clauses. Id. at 850–51. For a more detailed discussion of why the law recognizes
no general concept of church autonomy, see Lupu & Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity,
supra note 4, at 1296–99.
231. McKelvey, 800 A.2d at 856.
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between ‘competing religious visions,’ or cause interference with
a church’s administrative prerogatives, including its core right
to select, and govern the duties of, its ministers.232
The court must also examine the requested remedies to see if they
involve similar constitutional defects233:
If . . . the dispute can be resolved by the application of purely
neutral principles of law and without impermissible government
intrusion (e.g., where the church offers no religious-based justifi-
cation for its actions and points to no internal governance rights
that would actually be affected), there is no First Amendment
shield to litigation.234
Applying these principles to McKelvey’s lawsuit against the
Diocese of Camden, the Court reversed and remanded the case for
further proceedings.235 It instructed the lower court to review each
claim—including implied contract, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and breach of fiduciary duty—to see if adjudication would
interfere with church administration or interpretation of religious
principles, such as the meaning of a vow of celibacy.236 “McKelvey
can attempt to prove that he was sexually harassed by defendants,”
the Court wrote, “resulting in his leaving the seminary before he
could be considered for ordination.”237
McKelvey and Bollard, the two seminary cases in this quartet,
thus line up perfectly on both facts and constitutional analysis.238 Both
involve seminarians harassed by their supervisors, leading to suits
against religious entities.239 Both decisions reason that religious
entities have no blanket immunity from litigation arising from a
sexually hostile environment, whether the suit is based on Title VII
or a mix of state common law claims.240 Instead, church immunities
232. Id. at 856.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 860.
236. Id. at 858.
237. McKelvey, 800 A.2d at 858. McKelvey could not seek ordination as a remedy, but he:
might, without offending First Amendment principles, seek money damages
for the benefit defendants received from his free or reduced cost labor as an
‘intern’ in various diocesan churches and, based on Auxiliary Bishop Schad’s
letter, seek an order prohibiting defendants from attempting to recoup the
$69,000 tuition, book and fee costs.
Id. at 859. This case did not arise under Title VII, probably because of the relevant
statute of limitations.
238. See Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 944–45 (9th Cir.
1999); See also McKelvey, 800 A.2d at 853–54.
239. See supra note 238 and accompanying cases.
240. See id.
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must be evaluated in light of the relevant elements of the cause of
action and the potential in each case for interference with the selec-
tion of clergy or conflict with religious teaching.241 Finally, both
decisions echo Black v. Snyder’s analysis of available remedies.242
C. Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church
Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church.243 Elvig, which factually re-
sembles Black v. Snyder, is the final and most provocative decision
in this quartet.244 By the time the Ninth Circuit’s processes in Elvig
had concluded, several judges had expressed serious disagreement
about the soundness of the harassment exception to the ministerial
exception.245 Because the affirmative defense in Ellerth and Faragher
had emerged shortly before Elvig, the case offered the Ninth Circuit
an important opportunity to explore the constitutional implications of
that defense.246 Is it possible for courts to evaluate the reasonableness
of mechanisms for prevention and correction of harassment without
intruding on the internal governance of a religious institution? More-
over, several judges identified a potential constitutional problem if
the alleged harassment involved persistent discussion of religious
attitudes about sexual relationships and the role of women.247
The facts of Elvig appear to be simple. Monica McDowell Elvig
was an ordained Presbyterian minister.248 Calvin Presbyterian Church
(located in a Seattle suburb) hired her as an Associate Pastor, a posi-
tion in which she served from December 2000 until December 2001.249
Elvig’s complaint in federal district court alleged the following:
Senior Pastor William Ackles harassed her sexually and created a
hostile environment.250 When Elvig sought assistance from church
241. See id.
242. Compare Bollard, 196 F.3d at 950 and McKelvey, 800 A.2d at 856–57, with Black
v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715, 721 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that monetary damages
would not violate the ministerial exception).
243. See Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 951 (9th Cir. 2004), reh’g
denied; 397 F.3d 790, 790 (9th Cir. 2005).
244. See Elvig, 375 F.3d at 953–54; Black, 471 N.W.2d at 717–18.
245. See Elvig, 397 F.3d at 790.
246. See Elvig, 375 F.3d at 957.
247. Id. at 970 (Trott, J., dissenting).
248. Id. at 953.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 953–54. The particulars of the complaint are thin. As recited in the dissent
to the panel decision:
[t]he conduct claimed to be actionable involved winking, allegedly undressing
Elvig with his eyes, and other forms of unwelcome verbal attention which
she interpreted as harassing. Elvig did not succumb to Rev. Ackles [sic]
alleged harassment, and she has not offered any allegation that somehow
her job was in jeopardy if she did not do so.
Elvig, 375 F.3d at 971 (Trott, J., dissenting).
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authorities, they investigated but did nothing to stop the harass-
ment.251 When Elvig complained in October 2001 to the EEOC, Ackles
allegedly retaliated by stepping up the harassment.252 In December
2001, the church first put her on unpaid leave, and then terminated
her employment.253 Later that month, the Presbytery decided that
she was not qualified to seek employment as a Presbyterian minis-
ter anywhere in the United States.254
Her complaint asserted violations of Title VII in the form of sex-
ual harassment and retaliatory harassment, as well as related state
law claims.255 She sought damages for the harassment as well as equi-
table remedies, including an order granting her the right to seek pas-
toral employment at other Presbyterian churches.256 The district court
dismissed the complaint as barred by the ministerial exception.257
In an opinion for a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit, Judge
Fisher reversed with respect to the claims for damages arising from
a hostile environment and from retaliatory harassment.258 The
opinion invokes Bollard and proceeds identically.259 The court may
not review any adverse job action taken by the church against Elvig.260
Accordingly, the church’s decisions to suspend her without pay, termi-
nate her employment, and ultimately strike her from the roster of
Presbyterian ministers were all protected by the ministerial excep-
tion.261 In contrast, she may on remand attempt to prove that Pastor
Ackles sexually harassed her, and that the harassment increased in
retaliation for her complaints to church authorities and the EEOC.262
The court ruled that her remedies must be limited to tort-type dam-
ages arising from those past wrongs, and may not include reinstate-
ment or any damages for lost pay after the date of termination.263
The most controversial elements of Elvig arise from the defenses
the church may offer to harassment claims. First, the church may
assert that the harassment was a product of its religious teaching.264
251. Id. at 953–54.
252. Id. at 954.
253. Id.
254. Id. (“The Presbytery subsequently notified Elvig that its Committee on Ministry
had decided against permitting Elvig to circulate her church resume, or ‘personal infor-
mation form,’ effectively preventing her from acquiring other pastoral employment in
any Presbyterian church in the United States.”).
255. Id.
256. Elvig, 375 F.3d at 954.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 953.
259. Id. at 955–57.
260. Id. at 962.
261. Id. at 958.
262. Elvig, 375 F.3d at 960.
263. Id. at 966–67.
264. Id. at 963.
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Bollard said likewise, but Bollard involved homosexual harassment
in a seminary, where an avowed atmosphere of celibacy made such
a defense completely unlikely.265 The context of Elvig at least raised
the possibility of some religious justification.266 Second, the church
may assert the Ellerth-Faragher affirmative defense that it had in
place reasonable mechanisms to prevent and correct the harass-
ment, and that Pastor Elvig unreasonably failed to avail herself of
those mechanisms.267 The inquiry into this defense, says the panel
opinion, must be limited to secular concerns.268
The possibility of judicial intrusion on the substance of religious
teaching and on the internal governance of religious institutions,
plays out in other opinions that make up the Elvig suit.269 Dissent-
ing from the panel opinion,270 Judge Trott expressed his concern
that Bollard had been wrongly decided.271 The dissent noted that
Pastor Elvig had taken a vow to be “governed by our Church’s polity,
and to abide by its discipline.”272 Digging more deeply than Judge
Fisher into the record of proceedings in the district court, Judge Trott
described Elvig’s internal complaint, and the responsive mecha-
nisms provided by the Calvin Presbyterian Church and the Presby-
tery with which that congregation was associated.273 These included
a response team from within the church, followed by the appointment
of an Investigating Committee, all as prescribed by the Church’s
Book of Order.274 The final step in her review process involved a
petition to the Permanent Judicial Commission of the Presbytery,
which (after de novo review) affirmed the decision of the church’s
Investigating Committee to take no action against Pastor Ackles.275
This inquiry into Elvig’s pastoral vows and the church’s respon-
sive mechanism led Judge Trott to conclude that the ministerial
exception should bar all aspects of her sexual harassment claims.276
Judge Trott noted that Elvig’s lawsuit was itself a breach of her
265. Id. at 957 (citing Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940,
949–50 (9th Cir. 1999)).
266. See id. at 963.
267. Id. at 957–58.
268. Elvig, 375 F.3d at 963.
269. See id. at 961 and accompanying cases.
270. Judge Gould concurred briefly in the panel opinion, but asserted that he did so in
light of Bollard, about which he entertained “misgivings.” Id. at 970 (Gould, J., concurring).
271. See id. (Trott, J., dissenting).
272. Id. (citing Book of Order, G-14.0405b.(5), in CONSTITUTION OF THE PRESBYTERIAN
CHURCH (U.S.A.) (Office Gen. Assembly 2017–2019)).
273. Id. at 970–72.
274. Elvig, 375 F.3d at 971–72.
275. Id. at 971. Judge Trott also wrote that the church had offered repeatedly to
mediate between Elvig and Ackles, but that Elvig had refused. Id. at 972.
276. See id. at 975.
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vows.277 And it would be impossible, he argued, for courts to evalu-
ate the secular reasonableness of the responsive mechanisms.278 To
him, the case presented deep risks of substantive and procedural
entanglement between the court and the church.279 Bollard, he wrote,
was distinguishable because the plaintiff was a novitiate and not an
ordained priest, had not taken his final vows to accept church disci-
pline and order, and been offered no internal procedure.280 If Bollard
was not distinguishable, Trott concluded, it was wrong.281
The Church defendants petitioned for en banc review in the Ninth
Circuit.282 The Circuit denied the petition, but the denial produced
three dissents, representing the views of six judges.283 In the most
prominent dissent, Judge Kleinfeld284 rejected the distinction between
adverse job action claims and hostile environment claims. Building
on Judge Trott’s panel dissent, Kleinfeld insisted that supervision of
clergy was as important to the church’s constitutional freedom as
hiring and firing, and that adjudication of hostile environment
claims could affect the structure of ecclesiastical supervision.285 He
argued that the constitution barred evaluation of internal church
procedures offered to satisfy the affirmative defense in hostile envi-
ronment cases.286 Pastor Elvig had taken vows to be bound by church
277. Id.
278. Id. at 974–75.
279. Elvig, 375 F.3d at 974–75. In a separate action by Elvig against Ackles and the
institutional religious defendants, the state courts in Washington gave summary judg-
ment for the defendants on the ground that the case could not be adjudicated without
second-guessing church doctrine and governance. See Elvig v. Ackles, 98 P.3d 524, 525
(Wash. Ct. App. 2004). Although the issues in the state court proceeding were similar,
they involved state law claims and did not involve the Ellerth-Faragher affirmative
defense; moreover, the state proceeding had reached the summary judgment stage, while
the federal case had proceeded entirely on motions to dismiss, in which allegations had
to be taken as true. See id. at 525–26.
280. See Elvig, 375 F.3d at 980 (Trott, J., dissenting).
281. Id.
282. See Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 397 F.3d 790, 790 (9th Cir. 2005).
283. Id.
284. Id. at 798–806 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
285. Id. at 799. At least one post-Hosanna-Tabor decision seems to agree with Judge
Kleinfeld’s concerns. See Preece v. Covenant Presbyterian Church, No. 8:13CV188, 2015
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52751, at *17–19 (D. Neb. Apr. 22, 2015) (holding that ministerial em-
ployee may not bring Title VII claim for sexual harassment because judicial inquiry into
investigation of alleged conduct necessarily implicates ecclesiastical judgments). Kleinfeld’s
concerns are also reflected in the Missouri Supreme Court’s approach to sexual misconduct
claims against churches. See Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 247 (Mo. 1997) (holding
that plaintiff in tort action for failure to supervise clergy must prove that the religious
institution “intentionally” failed to provide appropriate supervision); see also Weaver v.
African Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., 54 S.W.3d 575, 575 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (ap-
plying Gibson to a claim of sexual abuse brought by a ministerial employee).
286. See Elvig, 397 F.3d at 799 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). Two separate dissents were
filed. Judge Gould agreed in a separate dissent that the affirmative defenses were
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procedures.287 Kleinfeld argued that courts should not aid the pas-
tor’s attempt to circumvent her vows.288 In addition, he wrote, many
religions teach particular views on sexuality and the role of women.
Accordingly, the content of the harassment may have included con-
demnation of what Pastor Ackles saw as sinful conduct.289
Judges Fletcher and Kozinski filed concurrences in the denial of
rehearing.290 Both responded directly to the dissenters’ concerns.
Judge Fletcher,291 who had authored Bollard, insisted that Elvig
was not materially different, and that both decisions were correct.
Both decisions had taken pains to confine the courts to secular in-
quiries into harassment and affirmative defenses, and to restrict
remedies and discovery in light of the ministerial exception.292 Judge
Fletcher explained that hostile environment cases are essentially
tort suits about the injury from harassment itself.293 The constitu-
tion does not bar tort suits against the negligent employers of clergy
who sexually abuse minors; hostile sexual environment suits should
be similarly allowed.294
Judge Kozinski’s concurrence elaborated on these themes.295
Judge Kleinfeld’s concern about potential interference with church
governance proves too much, Kozinski wrote.296 A sexual harassment
claim under Title VII by a non-minister, alleging harassment by a
minister, would frequently require inquiry into the reasonableness
of the church’s discipline and response mechanisms.297 Yet such a
suit would not be barred by the ministerial exception, because the
plaintiff was not a minister.298
constitutionally problematic in cases involving religious institutions as employers. Id.
at 806–07 (Gould, J., dissenting). In yet a third dissent, Judge Bea elaborated on that
theme, arguing that adjudication of the affirmative defense would require intrusive dis-
covery of prior cases within the church, inquiry into the composition of the Investigating
Committee, and the reasonableness of the Committee’s conclusion about whether Ackles
had harassed Elvig. Id. at 808–10 (Bea, J., dissenting).
287. Elvig, 375 F.3d at 970 (Trott, J., dissenting).
288. See Elvig 397 F.3d at 801 (Kleinfeld, J. dissenting).
289. Id. at 805. Nothing in the record supported this speculation.
290. Id. at 790 (Fletcher, J., concurring) (Kozinski, J., concurring).
291. See id. at 790–95 (Fletcher, J., concurring).
292. Id. at 791–92.
293. Id. at 790, 793.
294. Elvig, 397 F.3d at 792, 795.
295. Id. at 795–98 (Kozinski, J., concurring). We ignore here the colloquy, ultimately
more tiresome than clever, between Kozinski and Kleinfeld over the aptness of the analogy
to “Murder in the Cathedral.” Compare id. at 798 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting), with id. at
796–97 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
296. Id. at 798 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
297. Id. at 797.
298. Elvig, 397 F.3d at 797.
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Since Elvig, one federal appellate court299 and one federal district
court300 have adopted the view, contrary to the quartet, that the
ministerial exception bars hostile sexual environment lawsuits. The
appellate opinion asserts, without analysis, that Judge Kleinfeld’s
concerns in Elvig are well-taken.301 The district court similarly as-
serts, without explanation, that the harassment claim is barred be-
cause it is “factually entwined” with other claims in the litigation.302
Of course, the same could be said of both Black and Elvig, so this
concern alone cannot explain why those decisions are wrong.
In all other cases we have found, the principles announced in
the quartet have been explicitly followed.303 Elvig thus represents
the last significant judicial engagement with the tension between
sexual harassment claims and the constitutionally based ministerial
exception. The clashing opinions in Elvig throw into sharp relief all
of the issues raised by that tension, and Hosanna-Tabor invites a
fresh look at them. The #MeToo moment seems a most appropriate
time to take that look.
IV. RECONCILING THE LAW OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT WITH THE
MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION
As noted in Part I, our long-standing defense of the ministerial
exception rests on the constitutional impermissibility of adjudication
299. See Skrzypczak v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 611 F.3d 1238, 1244–46 (10th Cir.
2010). Ms. Skrzypczak was the Director of Religious Formation for the Diocese. Id. at
1240. The court ruled that her position was indeed ministerial, and that the Constitution
barred her claims for age and sex discrimination. Id. at 1244–46. The causes of action
included an assertion of hostile environment, though the court mentions no details of
that claim. Id. at 1244. Without engaging the issues that separate the judges in the
Ninth Circuit, the Tenth Circuit panel cast its lot with Judge Kleinfeld’s Elvig opinion,
in which he dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc. Id. at 1244–45.
300. See Preece v. Covenant Presbyterian Church, No. 8:13CV188, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 52751, at *17–19 (D. Neb. Apr. 22, 2015) (holding that a ministerial employee
may not bring a Title VII claim for sexual harassment because judicial inquiry into
investigation of alleged conduct necessarily implicates ecclesiastical judgments).
301. See Skrzypczak, 611 F.3d at 1244–45.
We are . . . persuaded that [the Bollard-Elvig] . . . approach could, as Judge
Kleinfeld argued . . . , infringe on a church’s ‘right to select, manage, and
discipline [its] clergy free from government control and scrutiny’ by influ-
encing it to employ ministers that lower its exposure to liability rather than
those that best ‘further [its] religious objective[s].’
Id. at 1245 (quoting Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 397 F.3d 790, 803–04 (9th Cir.
2005). The argument proves far too much. The imposition of liability for negligent hiring
of clergy who abuse minors produces the same effect.
302. Preece, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52751, at *19.
303. See Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Parish, 2018 U.S. Dist. Lexis 168584,
at *13–18 (N.D. Ill., Sept. 30, 2018); Bohnert v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of S.F., 136
F. Supp. 3d 1094, 1114–16 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Dolquist v. Heartland Presbytery, 342 F.
Supp. 2d 996, 1003–07 (D. Kan. 2004); Prince of Peace Lutheran Church v. Linklater,
28 A.3d 1171, 1176, 1184–85, 1192 (Md. 2011), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 937 (2012).
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of ecclesiastical questions.304 We reject any wider claim of church auto-
nomy. The principles enunciated in the controlling opinions in the
hostile environment quartet fit perfectly with our account. The
constitutional concerns raised in some of the dissenting opinions in
the quartet, however, deserve deeper exploration.
The issues highlighted in the quartet include (1) whether, for
purposes of the ministerial exception, adverse job action claims are
constitutionally different from those involving severe and pervasive
hostile environments; (2) whether a hostile environment can be
legally justified by religious teaching on matters of gender or sexual-
ity; (3) whether adjudication of the Ellerth-Faragher affirmative
defense to hostile environment actions leads, at least in some cases,
to constitutionally forbidden entanglement with the governance of
religious institutions; (4) whether the scope of discovery must be
limited in hostile environment cases against religious entities; and
(5) whether remedies in hostile environment cases against religious
entities must be limited to tort-type damages arising from the ha-
rassment itself.305 We consider these in turn.
A. The Distinction Between Adverse Job Action Claims and
Hostile Environment Claims
In agreement with the quartet, we believe that the distinction be-
tween claims of adverse job action and claims of a hostile environment
is constitutionally necessary.306 It is useful to begin the analysis by
focusing on the harms from the varieties of sexual harassment.307
304. See Lupu & Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity, supra note 4, at 1280–84.
305. See Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 397 F.3d 790, 791–93, 799, 805–08 (9th
Cir. 2005) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
306. Professor Levinson’s work concurs with the results in the quartet, but her work
takes Hosanna-Tabor as a starting point and advocates limiting it, without probing
deeply into its constitutional underpinnings. See Levinson, supra note 13, at 92, 119.
307. The #MeToo movement has produced an outpouring of impressive and powerful
writing by individuals about the harms of sexual harassment. See, e.g., Tom Bartlett &
Nell Gluckman, She Left Harvard. He Got to Stay, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Feb. 27, 2018),
https://www.chronicle.com/interactives/harvard-harassment [https://perma.cc/GQX4-WS
FA]; Rebecca Carroll, My Experience at Charlie Rose Went Beyond Sexism, ESQUIRE
(Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.esquire.com/entertainment/tv/a13978884/charlie-rose-sexual
-harassment-accuser-story [https://perma.cc/NBA2-ACPK]; Lupita Nyong’o, Lupita Nyong’o:
Speaking Out About Harvey Weinstein, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes
.com/2017/10/19/opinion/lupita-nyongo-harvey-weinstein.html [https://perma.cc /5QHT
-JUK8]; Rebecca Solnit, Rebecca Solnit On the #MeToo Backlash: Stop Telling Us How
to Confront an Epidemic of Violence and Abuse, LITERARY HUB (Feb. 12, 2018), https://
lithub.com/rebecca-solnit-on-the-metoo-backlash [https://perma.cc/VQN6-T8K7]; Jia
Tolentino, How Men Like Harvey Weinstein Implicate Their Victims in Their Acts, NEW
YORKER (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/culture/jia-tolentino/how-men-like
-harvey-weinstein-implicate-their-victims-in-their-acts [https://perma.cc/2TFN-Q77U];
Rebecca Traister, This Moment Isn’t (Just) About Sex. It’s Really About Work, CUT (Dec. 10,
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Unwelcome and persistent sexual attention will always be stressful,
sometimes extremely so. In some circumstances, that stress is aggra-
vated by threats of violence, emotional or physical.308
At work, if the unwanted attention is from a co-worker, the
target is captive to the stress, sometimes throughout the workday.309
If the harassment is from a supervisor, the stress is aggravated
further by the danger of an adverse job action—dismissal, denial or
promotion, reduction in hours or pay, etc.310 When that is added to
the mix, the anxiety of unwanted sexual attention is compounded by
economic anxiety, which may extend beyond immediate job loss to
the prospect of serious career derailment.311
When the harassment takes the form of gender-based denigra-
tion, even without sexual content, the harms may be equally severe.
This kind of harassment is aimed at breaking the confidence and
self-esteem of its targets, and can also do long-term damage to the
target’s psychological well-being and career.312
In a legal context without countervailing constitutional con-
cerns, all of these harms from sexual harassment are fully cogniza-
ble and may lead to a complete set of legal remedies.313 Feminist
critics of the ministerial exception quite understandably point to
this full set of harms.314 They argue that the exception protects re-
ligious entities against appropriate imposition of liability, and thereby
facilitates these harms to victims of discrimination, including ha-
rassment victims.315
2017), https://www.thecut.com/2017/12/rebecca-traister-this-moment-isnt-just-about-sex
.html [https://perma.cc/R9PV-PAWY].
308. See Bartlett & Gluckman, supra note 307.
309. See id.; see also Carroll, supra note 307.
310. See Traister, supra note 307.
311. The story of Judge Alex Kozinski’s former clerk, Heidi Bond, is a powerful example.
See Matt Zapotosky, Prominent Appeals Court Judge Alex Kozinski Accused of Sexual
Misconduct, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2017, 3:11 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world
/national-security/prominent-appeals-court-judge-alex-kozinski-accused-of-sexual-miscon
duct/2017/12/08/1763e2b8-d913-11e7-a841-2066faf731ef_story.html?utm_term =.b2bb85
cab423 [https://perma.cc/F5F7-ZVZ6]. For a first-person account of Kozinski’s treatment
of women, see Dahlia Lithwick, He Made Us All Victims and Accomplices, SLATE (Dec. 13,
2017), http://www.slate.com/articles /news_and_politics/jurisprudence /2017/12/judge_alex
_kozinski_made_us_all_victims_and_accomplices.html [https://perma.cc/GD9A-HPLP]. For
an eloquent comment on the type of career long harm suffered by Ms. Bond, see Amanda
Taub, The #MeToo Moment: How One Harasser Can Rob a Generation of Women, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/14/us/how-one-harasser-can-rob
-a-generation-of-women.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/8Q82-XXVJ].
312. See Schultz, supra note 86, at 1750–54 (illustrating how nonsexual gender-based
denigration impacts women’s feelings of competence in work and career advancement).
313. See Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 949–50 (9th Cir.
1999) (noting how the remedies generally available under Title VII are not all available
under the ministerial exception).
314. See Lupu & Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity, supra note 4, at 1310.
315. Corbin, Above the Law, supra note 14, at 2015; Levinson, supra note 13, at 114–15.
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As we have explained elsewhere, however, the critics have rarely
come to grips with the chasm at the center of their critique.316 Some
faith traditions completely exclude women from the ranks of clergy.317
Complete exclusion stigmatizes all women as unworthy of these
prestigious and socially significant positions, robs them of the oppor-
tunity to compete and excel as ministers, and denies the possible
fulfillment associated with successful ministry.318 In order to com-
pletely remedy the full set of harms that gender discrimination may
produce, courts would have to eliminate the ministerial exception
altogether. Those faiths with overt, theologically grounded exclusion
of women from ministry would be effectively forced to open the ranks
of clergy. Yet even the most ardent opponents of the ministerial ex-
ception seem to shrink at the prospect of this degree of coercion of
faith communities.319
If the ministerial exception retains its legal status and force—
and a unanimous Supreme Court decision in 2012 makes that ex-
tremely likely, constitutionally sensitive decision-making must find
the best way to reconcile it with the law of sexual harassment.320
The principles reflected in the quartet represent a good start in that
direction.321 The baseline for measuring the adequacy of sexual harass-
ment law in cases brought by clergy should not be the law with the
ministerial exception removed. Rather, the baseline should be the
otherwise robust scope of the exception. So measured, the sexual
harassment exception—allowing for hostile environment claims—to
316. Lupu & Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity, supra note 4, at 1310–14.
317. Similarly, some communities completely exclude openly LGBT persons from min-
isterial positions. Where LGBT discrimination is prohibited, the ministerial exception
operates to nullify the prohibition as applied to such positions. As demonstrated by Bollard
and McKelvey, involving harassment of male seminary students by males in supervisory
positions, same sex harassment can be a form of actionable sex discrimination. See Bollard
v. Cal. Province of Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 944 (9th Cir. 1999); McKelvey v. Pierce,
800 A.2d 840, 842 (N.J. 2002).
318. For a brief analysis of recent arguments for and against women being ordained
as Catholic priests, see Brooke Bobb, Keeping the Faith, VOGUE (May 4, 2018), https://
www.vogue.com/projects/13543313/roman-catholic-women-priest-movement-giulia
-bianchi [https://perma.cc/F43U-7T38]; Delia Gallagher, Why Has the Pope Said No to
Women Priests?, CNN (Nov. 2, 2016, 11:22 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2016/11/02/europe
/analysis-pope-female-priests/index.html [https://perma.cc/M8XF-BRAG]; Judith Levitt,
Women as Priests, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/30
/opinion/sunday/women-as-priests.html [https://perma.cc/AT83-JCFL].
319. Professor Corbin steers around the question. See Corbin, Above the Law, supra
note 14, at 2014, 2030–31. So does Professor Griffin. See Griffin, supra note 28, at 1016–17.
We engage pointedly with this and other aspects of the anti-ministerial exception
position in Lupu & Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity, supra note 4, at 1283–84, 1310–14.
320. See Lupu & Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity, supra note 4, at 1287 (describing how
sexual harassment cases can still be constitutionally adjudicated in light of Hosanna-
Tabor).
321. See id. at 1291.
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the ministerial exception serves laudable purposes in a constitution-
ally sound way.322
As Judge Fletcher suggested in Bollard, the harms of harass-
ment fall into more than one traditional legal category.323 The harms
of adverse job actions involve primarily lost opportunity.324 The
principles and remedies of contract law seem most appropriate to
dealing with such losses.325 In contrast, the harms arising from a
severe and pervasive hostile environment involve interests in dig-
nity, psychic well-being, and physical security typically protected by
the law of torts.326
The appeal to tort law principles reflects long-standing constitu-
tional norms about the limits of religious freedom.327 Religious
communities are free to define their own criteria for ministry, in the
same way that they are free to define the appropriate recipients of
their blessings and sacraments. But they are not similarly free,
without explicit consent, to act criminally or tortiously in ways that
violate the bodies, dignity, and psychic well-being of their members
and employees.328
This is the line that the decisions in the quartet have drawn, re-
flected in the distinction between adverse employment action claims—
barred by the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment—and hostile
environment claims.329 It fits precisely with our constitutional expli-
cation of the ministerial exception.330 We have argued our basic
322. To be sure, barring adverse job action claims means that sexual harassment law
cannot fully achieve its laudable goal of combating gender stereotypes and reinforcement
of traditional gender roles. This is the price of the constitutional good of disabling the
state from policing the hiring of clergy, and we understand why some critics believe that
price is too high. Moral suasion and evolution of social norms may push faith commu-
nities to work on their own, in the direction of ending gender discrimination, as many
have done.
323. See Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 947, 950 (9th Cir.
1999) (noting the different types of remedies available for harms from sexual harassment).
324. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761–62 (1998); Harris v. Forklift
Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
325. See Bollard, 196 F.3d at 950 (suggesting that, while barred by the ministerial
exception, the appropriate causes of action for remedies such as reinstatement are state
contract law claims).
326. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 756 (analyzing Title VII liability through the lens of tort
law); Harris, 510 U.S. at 23 (noting the potential impacts of a hostile work environment
on an employee’s psychological well-being).
327. See Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 397 F.3d 790, 795 (9th Cir. 2005)
(Fletcher, J., concurring).
328. See id. at 792–93.
329. See id. at 795 (delineating that a church’s decision to “hire, fire, promote, refuse
to promote, and prescribe the duties of its ministers” is protected under the ministerial
exception, while sexual harassment by a minister is not protected).
330. See Lupu & Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity, supra note 4, at 1280–84.
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position at length elsewhere,331 but it seems appropriate to reassert
its basic premises.
Religious institutions are subject to law. When they act in ways
that are fully analogous to secular entities, they are subject to regu-
lation by the state. They must answer, as secular entities do, for torts
committed by their agents.332
What appropriately separates church from state are the set of
activities and concerns that are religiously distinctive. Faith com-
munities develop principles about the relationship with a trans-
cendent order and practices associated with those principles. In
sharp contrast, our constitutional arrangements bar the government
from promoting worship of a divine entity or teaching a world-view
that is explicitly grounded in theology.333
This cleavage between secular and sacred explains a great deal of
the law of the Religion Clauses in general, including a long line of de-
cisions about church property and ecclesiastical personnel.334 The
ministerial exception does not rest upon any general immunity of re-
ligious employers from civil law governing the employment relation-
ship.335 These employers must comply with wage and hour laws,
workplace safety rules, and—in most circumstances—prohibitions
on employment discrimination based on race, national origin, or sex.336
The ministerial exception applies only when such prohibitions conflict
with the authority to decide who is fit to communicate the faith.337
In the context of sexual harassment, the distinction between
adverse job action claims and hostile environment claims maps per-
fectly onto the distinction between ecclesiastical questions and sec-
ular questions. When religious entities transfer, demote, fire, or
otherwise alter the assignment of a minister, they are expressing an
331. See LUPU & TUTTLE, SECULAR GOVERNMENT, supra note 53, at 43–45; Lupu &
Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and Congregations, supra note 4, at 122–23; See also Ira C. Lupu
& Robert W. Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our Constitutional
Order, 47 VILL. L. REV. 37, 92 (2002); Lupu & Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity, supra
note 4, at 1280–84.
332. See, e.g., Guinn v. Church of Christ of Collinsville, 775 P.2d 778–85 (Okla. 1989)
(holding that a church and its leaders may be held liable for defamatory statements about
a former member; any qualified privilege they may have held to speak in church about
the former member’s conduct ended when the member gave notice of withdrawal from
the church).
333. LUPU & TUTTLE, SECULAR GOVERNMENT, supra note 53, at 3–4.
334. See id. at 46–48. For examples of judicial abstention in cases involving strictly
ecclesiastical questions, see Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696,
724 (1976) (church personnel); Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 451–52 (1969) (church property).
335. See Lupu & Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and Congregations, supra note 4, at 132.
336. See Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 397 F.3d 790, 792 (9th Cir. 2005)
(Fletcher, J., concurring).
337. See Lupu & Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and Congregations, supra note 4, at 132.
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institutional view of whether that person is suited to a particular
clerical role. It is constitutionally irrelevant whether the unsuitabil-
ity is a product of substandard skills, inability to get along with a
sexually aggressive senior pastor, or some other reason, rational or
not. Of course, within a well functioning faith community, complaints
of sexual harassment and discrimination will be taken seriously,
and obnoxious behavior by supervising clergy will be dealt with
quickly and appropriately. However, the state may not intervene in
this supervision by reviewing a religious community’s decision about
the hiring, firing, or assignment of a minister.338
In contrast, the presence of a persistent hostile environment—
whether it affects clergy, lay employees, or both—can be remedied
through recognition of a right of action for the environmental harms.
This does not involve the state in dictating the status of particular
members of the clergy. It does involve imposing limits on mistreat-
ment of employees, and corresponding liability for the tortious harms
that religious communities may inflict on those within their employ.339
In an analogous context, courts have long recognized that reli-
gious entities may be liable for negligent supervision of clergy who
abuse children or other vulnerable persons.340 Breaches of that duty of
care can lead to imposition of substantial damages, both compensa-
tory and punitive.341 Courts may not order the expulsion of persons
from ministry,342 but they can and do impose liability on religious
employers that fail to protect victims from misbehaving clergy.
B. May Religious Teaching Justify a Severe and Pervasive Hostile
Environment?
This is a question initially raised by Judge Fletcher in Bollard,
when he suggested that religious doctrine may be relevant to a
sexual harassment suit. His opinion pointed out that:
The Jesuits do not offer a religious justification for the harass-
ment Bollard alleges; indeed, they condemn it as inconsistent
338. Elvig, 397 F.3d at 795 (Fletcher, J., concurring).
339. See id. at 796 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
340. In Bollard, Judge Fletcher cites several of the leading decisions imposing such
liability. See Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 948 (9th Cir.
1999). There are many more such decisions. See Lupu & Tuttle, Ecclesiastical Immunity,
supra note 1, at 1884.
341. See, e.g., Doe v. Archdiocese of Portland, 717 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1140–41 (D. Or.
2010) (denying defendants’ motion to dismiss Jane Doe’s request for punitive damages,
finding that “a reasonable finder of fact could conclude on the basis of [ ] Jane’s allega-
tions that the archdiocesan defendants’ conduct met the appropriate standard for award
of punitive damages . . . .”).
342. Courts do not permit suits for negligent ordination. We cite the leading decisions
on this point in Lupu & Tuttle, Ecclesiastical Immunity, supra note 1, at 1846 n.224–27.
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with their values and beliefs. There is thus no danger that, by
allowing this suit to proceed, we will thrust the secular courts
into the constitutionally untenable position of passing judgment
on questions of religious faith or doctrine. The Jesuits’ disavowal
of the harassment also reassures us that application of Title VII
in this context will have no significant impact on their religious
beliefs or doctrines.343
Along the same lines, Judge Kleinfeld’s Elvig opinion asserted
the possibility that pervasive and severe harassment might, in some
instances, be the product of religious teaching:
Suppose a minister in his daily morning prayer were to thank
God for making him a man and not a woman, as he would in at
least one religious tradition. . . . Or suppose a minister takes the
view, . . . that the Bible requires women to occupy a subordinate
position in the family, and that only men should be permitted to
preach. If he repeatedly, in his public prayers, asks God to bring
about such a world, and repeatedly tells his female associate
pastor that the Bible compels these views, she will no doubt
sense that the environment is hostile to her work and denies her
equality because of her sex. Yet the pastor (and his church) are
entitled to the free exercise of religion by spreading this view,
which he and perhaps his sect understand to be God’s word.
These opinions and prayers are political heresy. But in matters
of religion, churches get to define heresy, not the government.344
Judge Kleinfeld’s concerns are serious, but not nearly so well
taken as he thinks. First, cases in which the allegations of sexual
harassment involve the propagation of religious teaching are ex-
tremely rare.345 As the cases in the quartet reflect, the allegations
of harassment typically involve unwanted sexual attention—staring,
commenting, touching, propositioning, threatening, etc.346 It may be
that this sort of sexualizing of the relationship between supervisor
343. 196 F.3d at 947.
344. See 397 F.3d at 805 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
345. See Lupu & Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and Congregations, supra note 4, at 150 (ana-
lyzing why congregations would be reluctant to argue that sexual harassment constitutes
part of accepted religious teachings); see also Lupu & Tuttle, Ecclesiastical Immunity,
supra note 1, at 1818. To our knowledge, the sole harassment case in which religious
teachings have been offered as a defense is Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Parish,
2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168584 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2018), in which some of the alleged
harassment involved denigration within a Catholic parish of a music minister’s upcoming
same sex marriage. See id. at *3–5, *25–30. We discuss Demkovich infra note 361.
346. See Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 397 F.3d 790, 791 (9th Cir. 2005)
(Fletcher, J., concurring); Bollard, 196 F.3d at 944; McKelvey v. Pierce, 800 A.2d 840,
842 (N.J. 2002); Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W. 715, 717–18 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
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and the affected minister is a response to the supervisor feeling
threatened by the presence of women in the clerical profession, but
its outward manifestation is always sexual and personal, not general
and theological.347
Second, note that Judge Kleinfeld subtly slides “his church”
behind the harassing pastor’s sexist views.348 It is only in faith
communities that are open to female clergy however that such faith-
based harassment might occur. In those communities, the harassing
supervisor will be speaking for himself, not for his faith’s current
commitments.349 If he denigrates, even in theological terms, a female
employee, the employer will be highly unlikely to offer the defense
of religious teaching.350 Intrachurch impediments, rather than legal
norms, will block the emergence of such a defense.
No doubt, faith traditions that make a transition toward open-
ness to women or LGBT pastors may face a transition problem.
Their male cadre of clergy or other religious leaders may be uncom-
fortable with or even openly hostile to the change.351 In those cir-
cumstances, the religious community may well have a problem with
discipline of those clergy or leaders who resist, subtly or otherwise,
the church’s new teaching. In such cases, however, the conflict over
religious teaching is between the harasser and the church, not be-
tween the victim and the church. How faith groups deal with dis-
senting leaders through periods of transition is indeed a solely
ecclesiastical matter.352 It is the concern of the state only if these
leaders behave abusively toward clergy (or others) under their super-
vision.353 If that kind of behavior develops, the religious employer
incurs legal responsibility to intervene and faces liability if it fails
to do so.354
347. For a discussion on why some men might be uncomfortable or threatened by
female clergy, see Jennie Rothenberg Gritz & Eleanor Barkhorn, Why Are People Still
Uncomfortable with Female Rabbis and Pastors?, ATLANTIC (Dec. 21, 2012), https://www
.theatlantic.com/sexes/archive/2012/12/why-are-people-still-uncomfortable-with-female
-rabbis-and-pastors/266542 [https://perma.cc/P9QL-XGGF].
348. Elvig, 397 F.3d at 805 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
349. See Bollard, 196 F.3d at 947 (discussing that the Jesuits “condemn[ed] [the harass-
ment] as inconsistent with their values and beliefs”).
350. See id.
351. See Lupu & Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and Congregations, supra note 4, at 129 n.65
(suggesting that “[i]n the case of those faiths that openly exclude females from roles in
the clergy . . . the impact on the tradition and experience of the faith” would be sig-
nificant and potentially difficult).
352. See Elvig, 397 F.3d at 790–91 (Fletcher, J., concurring).
353. See Lupu & Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity, supra note 4, at 1290–91.
354. See Lupu & Tuttle, Ecclesiastical Immunity, supra note 1, at 1847–49 (analyzing
how some courts impose liability on religious institutions for negligent employment of
tortious ministers).
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If a faith community’s religious teaching ever included an ex-
plicit and fully disclosed policy of persistent sexual attention by lead-
ers towards clergy under their supervision, the denomination would
have a straightforward and effective defense to a sexual harassment
suit.355 That defense would be consent—explicit, not implied from
general circumstances of discipline and control in clergy employ-
ment.356 Becoming a minister in such a religious group would mean
the sexual attention was welcome.357 If the attention becomes un-
welcome, it is time to leave. And if the religious community coer-
cively prevents exit, the law can indeed remedy that through civil
suit for false imprisonment, or criminal complaint for kidnapping.358
The ministerial exception would bar neither of those measures.359
One very recent decision concerning sexual harassment of clergy
does involve the interaction of religious teaching with a pervasive
hostile environment. Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Parish,360
involves a suit by Sandor Demkovich against the Parish, which had
employed him as a music director, choir director, and organist be-
tween 2012 and 2014.361 The original complaint in the lawsuit alleged
that Demkovich had been unlawfully terminated on account of his
sex, sexual orientation, marital status, and disability.362 The federal
district court dismissed the suit on the ground that Demkovich’s
position fell under the ministerial exception.363
Demkovich then filed an amended complaint alleging that he had
been subjected to a pervasively hostile work environment on the same
grounds of sex, sexual orientation, marital status, and disability.364
355. See Elvig, 397 F.3d at 805 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (noting his lengthy example
of a minister whose church had misogynistic religious traditions).
356. See id. at 804–05.
357. It is far from clear whether employees should be free to consent to working in a
severe and hostile work environment. For arguments that women working in highly
sexualized occupations, such as strippers or prostitutes, should be protected from sexual
harassment notwithstanding their consent to such work, see Ann C. McGinley, Harass-
ment of Sex(y) Workers: Applying Title VII to Sexualized Industries, 18 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 65, 90–92 (2006). But see Lua Kamál Yuille, Sex in the Sexy Workplace, 9 NW.
J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 88, 91 (2013) (arguing that some jobs in sexualized industries may
include certain forms of sexual harassment under the “bona fide occupational quali-
fication” standard).
358. See Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass’n, 762 P.2d 46, 57–58 (Cal. 1988) (explaining that
although plaintiffs’ own false imprisonment claims were constitutionally barred, the court
recognized that there were other instances in which false imprisonment claims were
successfully brought against religious figures).
359. See id.
360. 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168584 (N.D. Ill., Sept. 30, 2018).
361. Id. at *3. The complaint also named the Archdiocese of Chicago as Demkovich’s
employer and a co-defendant. Id.
362. Id. at *1.
363. Id.
364. Id. at *2–3.
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In particular, Demkovich alleged that his supervisor, Reverend Jacek
Dada, repeatedly and viciously harassed him about being gay and
about his upcoming wedding to his same sex partner.365 Dada dis-
missed Demkovich from his position four days after the wedding.366 In
addition, the complaint further alleged that Dada harassed Demkovich
about his weight, which Demkovich attributed to the disabling condi-
tions of diabetes and a metabolic problem.367
In an opinion that tracks the principles enunciated in the quar-
tet of cases in Part III, the district court dismissed the portion of the
complaint pertaining to Demkovich’s sexual orientation but refused
to dismiss the portion alleging a hostile work environment based on
disability.368 The court recognized that the First Amendment does
not presumptively bar a suit for damages arising from a pervasively
hostile work environment.369 Based on the allegations in the com-
plaint, however, the court found that Reverend Dada’s harassment
of Demkovich reflected Catholic teaching with respect to his planned
wedding, and thus was constitutionally protected.370 In contrast, the
harassment with respect to Demkovich’s weight did not reflect such
teaching and therefore was actionable.371
Demkovich presents a subtle question about a hostile work
environment that is defended by the employer on the ground that it
reflects an undisputed religious teaching. Reverend Dada, acting for
the Parish, had several nonharassing options. Because Demkovich
was a ministerial employee, Dada could have lawfully dismissed
Demkovich as soon as Dada learned of the employee’s plan to marry
a same sex partner. Alternatively, Dada could have chosen to retain
Demkovich as a Music Director while encouraging him—in a re-
spectful or loving way, rather than a harsh and degrading way—to
bring his conduct into conformity with church teaching. But the
existence of nonharassing options does not liberate the judiciary
from the constitutional restriction on resolving exclusively ecclesias-
tical questions. The appropriate way of communicating that reli-
gious teaching presents such a question. Attempting to draw a line
between mild and severe methods of communication, or between
officially approved methods and an agent’s discretionary choice of
365. Demkovich, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168584, at *3–5. According to the complaint,
Dada referred to Demkovich and his partner as “bitches,” id. at *3, and described the
planned wedding to other employees as a “fag wedding,” id. at *4.
366. Id. at *5.
367. Id. at *5–6.
368. Id. at *34.
369. Demkovich, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168584, at *19–25.
370. See id. at *25–30.
371. Id. at *30–31.
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methods, would involve courts in impermissible questions concern-
ing the transmission of religious lessons within the church.372
Because the claim that religious teaching supports the hostile
environment would be a defense to otherwise actionable harass-
ment, the employer should have to assert that the employee had
violated the community’s religious principles. The employer simi-
larly should have to assert that the supervisor’s mode of expression
of those principles was in keeping with the faith. These require-
ments of accountability would validate the First Amendment de-
fense without involving the court in a forbidden adjudication of the
faith’s norms, or its means of communicating those norms.
C. Consequences of the Distinction Between Adverse Job Action
Claims and Hostile Environment Claims
By barring adverse job action claims while allowing hostile
environment claims in actions by clergy, our approach does have one
unfortunate consequence. In non-clergy cases, firing the complain-
ant is an adverse job action that can give rise to a variety of reme-
dies, including punitive damages and orders of reinstatement.373
Firing as a response to a harassment complaint thus expands the
potential liability of the employer, who may be already facing the
imposition of damages for the hostile environment.374 Moreover, the
Ellerth-Faragher defense is not available with respect to the harm
caused by adverse job actions.375
In cases involving clergy, however, religious employers are
liable only for the harm done by the hostile environment, not for the
separate harms of any adverse job action.376 This partial immunity
may give religious employers the incentive to dismiss a complaining
minister rather than retain the complainant and attempt to resolve
the conflict. Firing a clergy employee will cut off the period for en-
vironmental damage assessment at the effective date of the firing,
and will expose the employer to no additional liability.377
372. We think the court perceived an appropriate line between chastisement by speech
alone and that which involves physical assault or similar offenses. See id. at *18 (citing
Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1039–40 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting that the
“internal-affairs exception [to employment laws] is limited,” for instance, “[a] church could
not subject its clergy to corporal punishment or require them to commit criminal acts.”)).
373. See Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 950 (9th Cir.
1999) (recognizing that the ministerial exception bars the “state law claim for breach of
contract with an associated remedy of reinstatement”).
374. See id.
375. See Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 397 F.3d 790, 793 (9th Cir. 2005)
(Fletcher, J., concurring) (“[The Ellerth inquiry] is a restricted inquiry.”).
376. See id. at 796 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
377. See id.
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This is a tragic side effect of the operation of constitutional norms.
We might fix the situation by permitting all claims and remedies for
sexual harassment, which the Constitution forbids, or by permitting
none, which is a cure far worse than the disease. Moreover, religious
entities that welcome female clergy would be highly unlikely to fire
a complaining member of the clergy at the moment she speaks out.
She may be far more valuable than her harasser. The religious
entity may be deeply committed to finding peaceful and productive
means of internal dispute resolution. A wise lawyer advising a re-
ligious entity in these circumstances may flag the point about lim-
iting damages without insisting that this is the only or most sensible
course. For example, in both Black and Elvig, the respective churches
investigated the complaints and tried to work with the female pas-
tor until she took her complaint to a government agency.378
The employer’s institutional response to a hostile environment
complaint is a matter of prudent employment relations. No sensible
employer wants to simply cut loose a professional employee in whom
the institution has invested resources for education and training. Nor
will a religious entity be eager to explain—or lie—to worshippers
about why a church leader has suddenly disappeared from the pulpit.
Accordingly, maintaining employer liability for hostile environ-
ment claims, while immunizing religious employers against liability
for adverse job action claims, should incentivize the creation of
policies and precautions against sexual harassment.379 These incen-
tives are strongly reinforced, moreover, by the imposition of full
liability for sexual harassment of non-ministerial employees.380
D. Applying the Ellerth-Faragher Affirmative Defense in Hostile
Environment Actions by Clergy
We think the most difficult questions about the sexual harass-
ment exception arise from application of the Ellerth-Faragher
378. See generally Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 953–54 (9th Cir.
2004); Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715, 718 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991). Hosanna-Tabor, which
involved disability rather than harassment, revealed a similar pattern, in which negotia-
tions broke off only when the plaintiff minister complained to a government agency.
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 180 (2012).
379. These policies should include protection of clergy from sexual harassment by lay
members of the congregation—including those who are not involved in governance of the
congregation or supervision of the affected cleric. In this respect, religious employers
should be subject to the same norms as other employers who are required to protect
employees against sexual harassment by customers. See, e.g., EEOC v. Love’s Travel
Stops & Country Stores, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1177 (D. Ariz. 2009); Menchaca v. Rose
Records, No. 94-C-1376, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4149, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 1995);
Powell v. Las Vegas Hilton Corp., 841 F. Supp. 1024, 1025 (D. Nev. 1992).
380. Love’s Travel Stops, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 1185.
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affirmative defense to religious bodies.381 This was the centerpiece of
the brief dissent in Black v. Snyder and of several opinions in Elvig.382
Recall the Supreme Court’s formulation of the affirmative de-
fense, applicable to hostile environment claims alone:
When no tangible employment action is taken, a defending
employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or dam-
ages, subject to proof by a preponderance of the evidence, . . . .
The defense comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the em-
ployer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly
any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff em-
ployee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or
corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid
harm otherwise.383
The defense has two prongs, and the first is likely to invite
assertions by religious employers that adjudication involves judicial
second-guessing of the reasonableness of their steps “to prevent and
correct . . . any sexually harassing behavior.”384 Let us start with
prevention. The most common steps that employers take to prevent
harassment are (1) development and articulation of a policy about
sexual harassment, including gender-based denigration and un-
wanted sexual attention in the workplace; (2) training of employees
in the purposes, operation, and meaning of such a policy; and (3)
taking care in the employment of supervisors.385 None of these steps
are likely to invite judicial evaluation of theological understandings.
Of course, a religious denomination may express its concern about
harassment of employees, clergy included, in religious terms. With re-
spect to policies and training, we can imagine the deployment of
language about respecting the dignity of the person, in addition to or
instead of more conventional phrasing about the physical and emo-
tional integrity of employees. All that matters for purposes of the
defense, however, is that the policy and training be reasonable steps
to prevent the wrong.386 Preferring secular to religious understandings
of the wrong would raise a constitutional problem of discrimination
against religion.387 Employers, secular or religious, are required to
381. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
382. See Black, 471 N.W.2d at 722 (Randall, J., dissenting).
383. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807 (emphasis added).
384. Id.
385. See, e.g., U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, Best Practices for Employers and
Human Resources/EEO Professionals, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/initiatives/e-race/bestprac
tices-employers.cfm [https://perma.cc/FRJ2-P8JK] [hereinafter EEOC Best Practices].
386. Id.
387. Lupu & Tuttle, Ecclesiastical Immunity, supra note 1, at 1844.
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provide good faith and effective communication, in any terms that
supervisors and other employees can reasonably understand.388
Prevention of harassment through diligence in selecting super-
visors can be understood similarly. Religious organizations under-
stand that they risk liability if they fail to use reasonable care in
screening clergy who are (1) in a position to sexually abuse vulnera-
ble people; or (2) likely to ignore reports of workplace sexual harass-
ment of those under their supervision.389 This has manifested itself
most substantially in cases of sexual abuse of minors, but sexual
harassment presents analogous risks. Of course, it may be that ordi-
nary practices of screening do not disclose a propensity to sexually
harass or to be indifferent to such harassment.390 Once complaints
have been made and verified against particular religious leaders,
however, their employers will be on notice of the risk.391 If employers
return these supervisors to a position from which they can continue
the same conduct, employers will face the prospect that courts will
find them to have failed to use reasonable means of prevention.392
The overarching question in evaluating a religious entity’s
mechanisms for prevention and correction of sexual harassment is
whether they reasonably satisfy the specified secular goals.393 Com-
pared to prevention, mechanisms for correction are more complex to
evaluate because (1) religious organizations are likely to vary widely
in their methods of investigation and discipline, and (2) those methods
are frequently tied to a faith group’s religious understanding of church
order.394 Recall that in Black v. Snyder and Elvig v. Calvin Presbyte-
rian Church, dissenting judges expressed concern that applying the
affirmative defenses to harassment cases would unconstitutionally
entangle the courts in the evaluation of church governance.395
In both Black and Elvig, the inquiries into the alleged harass-
ment were made initially by committees of the respective congrega-
tions, and—when those groups did not find harassment—then on
appeal to denominational bodies that governed a number of congre-
gations in a particular geographic region.396 In more purely congre-
gational arrangements, corrective measures will be made only at the
388. See EEOC Best Practices, supra note 385.
389. See Lupu & Tuttle, Ecclesiastical Immunity, supra note 1, at 1848 n.234 and
accompanying cases.
390. Id. at 1795.
391. Id. at 1866.
392. Id. at 1843.
393. Id. at 1821.
394. Id. at 1854.
395. See supra notes 91–103, 121–41 and accompanying text.
396. See Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 971 (9th Cir. 2004), reh’g
denied, 397 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 2005); Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715, 722 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1991).
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congregational level. In an interconnected or strictly hierarchical
religious polity, the corrections are likely to be undertaken by an
office that is organizationally upstream from the place of offense—
for example, in a Roman Catholic Diocese or a Methodist Conference.
It is impossible for us to evaluate the broad range of possibili-
ties for corrective mechanisms across religious communities. What
we can confidently say, however, is that such mechanisms must be
measured by secular criteria of design and effectiveness. The em-
ployer must find a safe way for employees, including clergy, to report
harassment. The line of reporting cannot begin with the harasser
himself, or with any other person who has obvious loyalties to the
accused over the accuser. The fact-finding inquiry must provide the
accuser a respectful and meaningful opportunity to be heard. And
the response to any findings of harassment should include recom-
mendations for correction, including when appropriate the transfer
of complainant or perpetrator to a different position. The particular
form of these steps is up to the reasonable discretion of the employer.
Corrective mechanisms in religious organizations do not have to line
up perfectly with their counterparts in secular organizations.397
Judge Kleinfeld’s opinion in Elvig emphasizes that Pastor Elvig
“[had] vowed ‘to be governed by . . . [ ] Church’s polity, and to abide
by its discipline.’ ”398 No one disputes that. The question is the legal
significance of such vows and commitments. With respect to her status
as a pastor in the church, the scope of these promises—and the con-
sequence of their breach—present exclusively ecclesiastical ques-
tions.399 When, as a result of Ms. Elvig’s complaint to the EEOC or
her suit in civil court, leaders of the Presbyterian Church chose to end
Ms. Elvig’s ministerial eligibility, the Ninth Circuit panel correctly
decided that it could not review that decision.400
397. As Judge Fletcher wrote in Bollard,
[The Ellerth inquiry] is a restricted inquiry. Nothing in the character of this
defense will require a jury to evaluate religious doctrine or the “reason-
ableness” of the religious practices followed within the Jesuit order. Instead,
the jury must make secular judgments about the nature and severity of the
harassment and what measures, if any, were taken by the Jesuits to pre-
vent or correct it. The limited nature of the inquiry, combined with the
ability of the district court to control discovery, can prevent a wide-ranging
intrusion into sensitive religious matters.
Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 950 (9th Cir. 1999).
398. 397 F.3d at 801 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (quoting Elvig, 375 F.3d at 970 n.9
(Trott, J., dissenting)).
399. See Elvig, 375 F.3d at 973.
400. Id. at 975. Indeed, this is similar to the course that Ms. Perich’s case took in
Hosanna-Tabor. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC,
565 U.S. 171, 179 (2012) (reciting that the school rescinded Ms. Perich’s “call” as a re-
sponse to her insubordination).
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The institutional consequences of her vows, however, can be fully
separated from their legal consequences. If a pastor had been forc-
ibly raped by a fellow church employee, the church could not rely on
the pastor’s vows to prevent her from making a criminal complaint
or bringing a civil suit.401 That civil suit might name the employer
as a defendant if it had negligently hired or supervised the perpetra-
tor. The ministerial exception is designed to protect a religious
entity’s choice of minister, not to insulate it from all legal conse-
quences of that decision.402
The second prong of the Ellerth-Faragher affirmative defense
is whether the complainant unreasonably failed to avail herself of
corrective opportunities, or to otherwise avoid the harm.403 On this
question, religious organizations are no more likely than secular
ones to be the locus of special problems.404 In any organization, the
channels for complaint and correction must be accessible and safe.405
Telling an assistant pastor that she may complain only to her harasser
is not sufficient.406 Such a procedure—in a religious or secular en-
tity—will seem dangerous and unreliable. Of course, the smaller the
entity, the more difficult it will be to fully bypass the alleged harasser
in the complaint process. There should always be a person or group—
for example, a governing Board of a congregation—that can be
sensibly empowered to hear the complaints and begin the inquiry.407
E. The Scope of Discovery
The ministerial exception often invites questions related to dis-
covery. A particular problem arises when the parties dispute whether
the plaintiff is a ministerial employee.408 In such a case, the defen-
dant is asserting that the merits of the challenged job action against
the plaintiff are constitutionally off-limits to inquiry.409 As one of the
authors of this piece has recently argued,410 when a defendant has
raised the ministerial exception in a motion for summary judgment,
courts should exercise their discretion to limit discovery to factual
questions related to disposition of that issue. If the court finds that
401. Elvig, 375 F.3d at 963.
402. Id. at 953.
403. Id. at 959.
404. Id. at 963.
405. Lawton, supra note 149, at 257–58 (explaining that rational fear of retribution
can, at times, lead to reasonable delay in reporting harassment).
406. Id. at 202.
407. Id. at 231 n.157.
408. Smith & Tuttle, supra note 56, at 23.
409. Id. at 1.
410. Id. at 34.
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the plaintiff is not a ministerial employee, discovery on other issues
related to quality of employee performance can properly proceed.411
Sexual harassment cases brought by those who, without ques-
tion, fall into the ministerial exception do not raise the same sort of
sequencing issues.412 As the panel opinions in both Bollard and
Elvig explain, discovery in hostile environment cases can be limited
to factual questions related to the workplace relationship.413 Because
the ministerial exception bars inquiry into evaluation of the plain-
tiff’s job performance, discovery into such matters is constitutionally
out of bounds.414 Of course, the plaintiff may dispute the applicability
of the ministerial exception in a harassment case challenging an ad-
verse job action.415 In such circumstances, discovery into the applica-
bility of the exception should precede discovery into job performance.416
There is no reason to delay discovery into a hostile environment,
because that claim may proceed whether or not the ministerial ex-
ception applies.417
F. Remedies in Hostile Environment Cases
In every decision in the sexual harassment quartet, the court
addressed the question of available remedies.418 As we noted at the
end of Part II, in a sexual harassment case unconstrained by the
ministerial exception, remedies may include compensatory and puni-
tive damages for the environmental harassment; orders of reinstate-
ment; and forward-looking compensatory damages in cases of a
wrongful job action—that is, a remedy designed to put the plaintiff
in the financial place she would have been without the discrimina-
tory job action.419
In the harassment quartet, every judge who addressed remedial
questions agreed that the forward-looking remedies of reinstatement
and lost pay in consequence of an adverse job action were off limits.420
411. Id. at 35.
412. Id. at 19.
413. Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 967–68 (9th Cir. 2004), reh’g
denied, 397 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 2005); Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196
F.3d 940, 950 (9th Cir. 1999) (“The limited nature of the inquiry, combined with the ability
of the district court to control discovery, can prevent a wide-ranging intrusion into sensi-
tive religious matters.”).
414. Elvig, 375 F.3d at 967.
415. Bollard, 196 F.3d at 947.
416. Smith & Tuttle, supra note 56, at 1.
417. Id. at 42.
418. Elvig, 375 F.3d at 966; Bollard, 196 F.3d at 950; McKelvey v. Pierce, 800 A.2d
840, 858–59 (N.J. 2002); Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715, 720–21 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
419. See supra Part II.
420. Bollard, 196 F.3d at 950.
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This conclusion follows logically from the initial move that adverse
job action claims are barred by the ministerial exception.421 Because
the defendant religious entity has unfettered discretion to terminate
its relationship with a cleric, the court may neither inquire into the
reasons for that action nor provide the relief that ordinarily accom-
panies an unlawful termination.422
Limiting the substance of harassment claims to those that arise
from the workplace environment has sharp and obvious remedial
consequences. In the vast majority of cases that involve a severe and
pervasive hostile environment, damages will include those that arose
from the infliction of emotional distress.423 In a case like McKelvey,
where the Diocese communicated an intent to recover a subsidy for
payment of educational expenses,424 remedies may also include an
order of setoff in favor of the plaintiff.425
In harassment cases, an employer may defend against requests
for punitive damages by showing that it has made “good faith efforts
to enforce an antidiscrimination policy.”426 We have found no cases
about sexual harassment of clergy in which this defense has been
put into play. It resonates with the terms of the Ellerth-Faragher
affirmative defense, although it is obviously more lenient.427 This
defense allows escape from punitive damages, through a showing of
good faith, even if a policy against harassment is legally insufficient
to satisfy the requirements of the affirmative defense.428
We see no reason to believe that a demand for a good faith effort
will involve any intrusion into the authority of religious entities to
choose their leaders. The sexual harassment carve-out from the
ministerial exception has at its base the principle that religious
entities, like all other employers, must protect their employees from
certain kinds of indignity and disrespect.429 Once we recognize the
421. Elvig, 375 F.3d at 953.
422. Bollard, 196 F.3d at 948–49.
423. McKelvey, 800 A.2d at 846.
424. Id.
425. Bollard alluded to a theory of “constructive discharge” when the harassment leads
the complainant to abandon the position. 196 F.3d at 947 (“[C]onstructive discharge in
the context of Bollard’s Title VII sexual harassment claim functions only to signal his
estimation of the severity of the harassment and to lay the foundation for including lost
wages in a calculation of damages.”). When the plaintiff leaves the job without experi-
encing any adverse job action, a damage award for lost back pay does not interfere with
a religious entity’s judgment about whom it wants in ministry.
426. Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 546 (D.D.C. 1999). Note that Kolstad
appeared just one year after Ellerth and Faragher.
427. Compare Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 775 (1998), with Kolstad,
527 U.S. at 528.
428. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 544.
429. Smith & Tuttle, supra note 56, at 8.
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substantive justice and constitutional acceptability of that principle,
it seems completely appropriate to conclude that an entity that has
not even made a good faith effort to enforce its antiharassment policy
bears responsibility for the harms done in its workplace.430 Con-
sciously ignoring reports of a severe and pervasive hostile environ-
ment invites punishment. Courts face no constitutional impediment
to applying this notion of good faith effort to religious organizations,
precisely as it applies to secular employers.431
G. A Closing Note on Other Theories of the Ministerial Exception
and Their Relationship to Sexual Harassment
We believe it would be illuminating to compare our theory of the
ministerial exception, including the vital distinction between hostile
environment claims and adverse job action claims in sexual harass-
ment cases, to the approaches taken by other scholars. We have al-
ready noted our disagreement with some feminist scholars, who would
eliminate or severely circumscribe the ministerial exception.432
The scholars who defend the ministerial exception fall into three
primary categories: (1) those who defend a very broad concept of
church autonomy or sovereignty (the “institutionalists”); (2) those
who argue that the ministerial exception arises from a concept of
religious voluntarism, which in turn supports a doctrine of implied
consent to discrimination (“implied consent” theorists); and (3) those
who defend the exception as an incident of freedom of association,
available to secular as well as religious entities (“associational free-
dom theorists”).433
For reasons we explain at length in earlier work, all three
approaches are badly flawed.434 Almost none of their proponents,
however, have responded to our general critique,435 or to our focused
430. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 544.
431. Faragher, 24 U.S. at 805.
432. See Lupu & Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity, supra note 4 and accompanying text.
433. Michael Helfand, Implied Consent: A Primer and a Defense, 50 CONN. L. REV.
1, 3–4, 10, 16 (forthcoming, 2018) [hereinafter Helfand, Implied Consent].
434. Lupu & Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity, supra note 4, at 1297–1310.
435. Professor Michael Helfand is a notable exception. He has in several recent articles
analyzed problems of sexual misconduct—including abuse of minors—within religious
institutions. In both pieces, Professor Helfand argues that such problems should be
analyzed exclusively under the Free Exercise Clause, and that “strict scrutiny” is the
appropriate methodology for courts to use. See Helfand, Implied Consent, supra note 433,
at 19–24 nn.83–96; Michael Helfand, Religious Institutionalism, Implied Consent, and
the Value of Voluntarism, 88 S.CAL. L. REV. 539, 552 n.64 (2015). Professor Helfand has
not applied his preferred test to questions of sexual harassment of employees. As we
have explained above, the Court’s treatment of the ministerial exception in Hosanna-
Tabor relies considerably on the Establishment Clause as a bar to judicial decision of
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challenge that they consider the case of sexual harassment of clergy.436
We imagine scholars in each of these camps might have more to say
in response to both our general critique and our specific challenge.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in Hosanna-Tabor Evangeli-
cal Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC surprised many observers in
its breadth, precise grounds of decision, and unanimity.437 The decision
left open, however, the distinct possibility that some legal claims in-
volving clergy and their employers might still be open to legal redress.
As this Article has demonstrated and defended, claims by clergy that
their work environment is severely and pervasively hostile fall per-
fectly into that opening. In a time when many women are bravely
chronicling their experiences in hostile workplaces, this reassurance
that religious entities are not entirely immune from suit, just as
they are not immune from criticism, should be most welcome.
ecclesiastical questions. Accordingly and wisely, the Court avoids “strict scrutiny” or any
other method of interest balancing in such cases. It is not at all obvious to us that
Hosanna-Tabor would be decided the same way under Helfand’s approach. The govern-
ment has a compelling interest in encouraging reports of unlawful conduct to the EEOC.
Prohibiting retaliation against employees who report (such as Cheryl Perich) is narrowly
tailored to that interest.
436. Lupu & Tuttle, The Mystery of Unanimity, supra note 4, at 1303–04 (challenging
“freedom of the church” theorists and “implied consent” theorists to apply their ideas to
cases involving sexual harassment of clergy).
437. See Helfand, Implied Consent, supra note 433, at 12.
